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ABSTRACT
For a long period of time, the golden standard in judicial fact-finding
of criminal cases in the United States and many other countries has been the
“Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” (BARD) standard – every person accused of
a crime is presumed to be innocent unless, and until, his or her guilt is
established beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The BARD standard’s undergirding
principle is one of error distribution, where wrongful conviction of the
innocent is a much greater wrong than failed conviction of the guilty. This
concept was famously expressed by the English jurist William Blackstone in
1760s: “It is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent
suffer.”2 This principle is widely regarded as “the Mount Everest of legal
mantras;”3 however, a closer look at the BARD standard reveals many
potential doubts: What is meant by eliminating reasonable doubt? Where does
this standard come from? There is no clear answer so far. Given the passage
of time, does the Blackstone Principle still accurately reflect the policy or
value choice of today’s society? How can empirical studies be done on the
effectiveness of the BARD standard in practice?
This article seeks to give the BARD standard the careful attention it
deserves by querying it from historical, epistemological, and empirical
perspectives. Even though each of these three areas of inquiry involves its own
unique controversy or difficulty, we can come even closer to an understanding
of BARD by studying its origins, its ideological underpinnings, and its
workings in practice. In particular, this article proposes a novel empirical
formula to approximate the effect of BARD in restraining wrongful
convictions through the lens of indirect but available statistical data on
acquittals, reversals, and non-prosecutions. The best way to study this
venerable common-law notion is to examine its recent implementation in a
civil law system, namely, China’s legal system. We identify operations of the
criminal justice system in China between 2007 and 2018 as the most suitable
for focusing this empirical study because China began implementing the
BARD standard in 2013 as a complement to its existing standard of proof in
criminal cases – the “reliable and sufficient evidence” standard. Our study
shows that although implementation of the BARD standard in the Chinese
1

See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 352 (1769).
3
Laura I. Appleman, A Tragedy of Errors: Blackstone, Procedural Asymmetry, and
Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2015). See the National Registry of
Exonerations, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last
visited September 22, 2021) (Even so, according to U.S. National Registry of Exonerations,
a project collecting and publicizing information about all known exonerations of innocent
criminal defendants in the United States, there were 2,869 exonerations between 1989 and
September 2021, and those wrongfully convicted had collectively lost more than 25,600
years to prison).
2

122

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 50:119

criminal justice system has been generally helpful in restraining wrongful
convictions, its effect is limited. The two standards are effectively treated the
same in practice. China’s move to the BARD standard was only a formal
change, rather than a substantive modification to its criminal justice system.
Our empirical study is a demonstration that the formal standard of proof may
not matter all that much. Courts have an intuitive understanding of the high
standard of proof required in the criminal context and are going to apply it
accordingly, no matter whether we call it “reliable and sufficient” or “beyond
a reasonable doubt”.
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult, if not impossible, to so define the term “reasonable doubt” as
to satisfy a subtle and metaphysical mind, bent on the detection of some
point, however attenuated, upon which to hang a criticism. --- Supreme
Court of Virginia (1905)4
The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a mode of
measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet no
successful method of communicating intelligibly . . . a sound method of selfanalysis for one’s belief. --- John Henry Wigmore (1940)5
The same points are true in criminal cases: The effect of burdens of
persuasion cannot be determined analytically and neither can the effect of a
change in the burden of persuasion be determined analytically. They are
both empirical questions. --- Ronald J. Allen (2014)6
The long-standing standard of proof for criminal trials in AngloAmerican legal systems—“beyond a reasonable doubt” (BARD)—is a magic
phrase. It is like a charm that, when spoken, drives the legal system. Take the
criminal justice system in the United States: it is magically important in theory
that as the cornerstone to American criminal jurisprudence, an accused shall
be presumed innocent until the government proves guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. A criminal defendant shall be found not guilty and thus acquitted if the
BARD standard is not satisfied.7 The standard is also magically powerful in
4

McCue v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E. 623, 629 (Va. 1905).
9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 325 (3d ed. 1940).
6 Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK 195, 212 (2014).
7 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453 (1895)); see also Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal
Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2015) (noting that if even one juror insists that the
5
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practice: in the federal court system, as well as in most state courts, the
criminal trial judge instructs the jurors that in order to convict the defendant,
they need to unanimously find that the prosecutor has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. A
judge’s failure to so instruct a jury constitutes automatic grounds for reversing
a conviction.8
While it is magically important and magically powerful, the BARD
standard is also magically mysterious. The origins and early development of
this standard are still the subject of controversy, even after centuries of usage.
And, as is more commonly known, not only does no settled definition of
BARD exist, but efforts to firmly define it have been met with resistance; as
the chief judge of a U.S. Court of Appeals once said, “I find it rather unsettling
that we are using a formulation that we believe will become less clear the more
we explain it.”9 This article seeks to meet this challenge, not by explaining the
BARD standard but by querying it from multiple perspectives: historical,
epistemological, and, finally, empirical. Even though no one, it seems, can
fully explicate this concept—which slips away from us with any attempt to do
so—we can come closer to an understanding of it by studying its origins, its
ideological underpinnings, and its effect in practice.
Each of these areas of inquiry involve a unique controversy or
difficulty. With regard to the origins and definition of BARD, the issue is a
lack of agreement; how we define BARD, and how it even came to be, has
been the topic of much discussion. BARD is accepted in many different
criminal justice systems as the proper formula to set out the burden of
persuasion, but no one can pin down its precise birth date10 or convincingly
demarcate its early development.11 Everyone knows that BARD is a high
BARD standard is not satisfied, the result is a hung jury and the defendant may not be
punished, though he may be retried).
8 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority
Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 671
(1997) (noting that only two states permit conviction by non-unanimous juries). See
generally In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
9 Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 984 (1993).
10 Most scholars nowadays agree that the Boston Massacre trial (1770) in which five British
soldiers were indicted and tried for murder of five civilians in front of the State House of
colonial Massachusetts in Boston was the earliest instance presently known in which the
beyond a reasonable doubt was articulated. See Anthony A. Morano, A Reexamination of
the Development of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507, 508 (1975). But see
John Wilder May, Some Rules of Evidence: Reasonable Doubt in Civil and Criminal Cases,
10 AM. L. REV. 642 (1876) (claiming that the reasonable doubt standard originated in the
Irish Treason in 1798).
11 See, e.g., Miller W. Shealy, Jr., A Reasonable Doubt about “Reasonable Doubt,” 65
OKLA. L. REV. 225, 270 (2013) (“There are currently two lines of thought regarding the
development of the ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard. For lack of a better form
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standard of proof, higher than the “preponderance of evidence” and the “clear
and convincing evidence” standards in civil cases, but no one knows exactly
how high in degree it reaches.12 Nor is there common understanding on what
“reasonable doubt” means.13
When we turn to the BARD standard’s ideological and
epistemological underpinnings, we find that the issue shifts from a lack of
agreement among scholars to an inherent contradiction or paradox: the BARD
standard supports a desired distribution of errors—with more wrongful
acquittals than wrongful convictions, in keeping with the Blackstone
principle—but in doing so it increases the overall error rate.14 Our discussion
about this incongruity between what we term the first and second goals of the
criminal justice system (error reduction and error distribution, respectively) is
supported by a series of illustrative diagrams.15 From an epistemological
perspective, there are four (and only four) possibilities with respect to the
result of a criminal case adjudicated: correct conviction, correct acquittal,
wrongful conviction, and wrongful acquittal.16 Since adjudicating errors will
occur from time to time, the question at hand is which sort of error—wrongful
acquittal or wrongful conviction—is more serious and, thus, more earnestly
to be avoided.17 The Blackstone principle holds firmly that convicting an
innocent person is a significantly more costly mistake than acquitting a guilty
one, with Sir William Blackstone stating that “it is better that ten guilty
persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”18 The BARD standard helps
of expression, the first view will be termed the ‘received view.’ The second view is the
theological analysis recently offered by Professor James Q. Whitman in his book The
Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial.”). For a more
detailed discussion, see Part I-A.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409–10 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d,
603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1970).
13 See, e.g., Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined? 12
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195 (1997); Shealy, supra note 11, at 225 (“The [U.S.] Supreme
Court has failed to define the concept of ‘reasonable doubt’ with any precision. The Court
tolerates conflicting definitions of ‘reasonable doubt.’ It permits some jurisdictions to
forbid any definition of ‘reasonable doubt,’ while giving others wide latitude to define the
concept in ways that are contradictory.”). For a more detailed discussion, see Part I-B.
14 See Epps, supra note 7, at 1068.
15 See Figures 1-3 in Part II-B.
16 For a more detailed discussion, see Part II-B.
17 See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 1 (2006) [Hereinafter LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW].
18
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352 (1769); See also Alexander Volokh, n
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (“The ratio 10:1 has become known as the
‘Blackstone ratio.’”). But see JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 169
(1829); Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (2015); Marvin Zalman, The Anti-Blackstonians: Thinking About Different Strokes,
48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1319 (2018).
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ensure that this imbalance occurs.19 And yet, as we show, not only do
wrongful acquittals come with problems of their own, but—more
concerningly—when the standard of proof becomes higher, the total number
of wrongful findings increases.20 Implementation of the BARD standard risks
overshadowing the ultimate goal of any criminal justice system – to find the
truth and promote overall accuracy in trial outcomes.21
Finally, the question of how BARD works in practice lands us in the
realm of empirical inquiry, in which the issue is a lack of measurable
evidence. Law is ultimately a profession that shapes the way in which
individuals and institutions behave, and any legal rule—but especially one as
powerful and controversial as the BARD standard—should ideally be
examined empirically for observable outcomes. As Larry Laudan once
complained, the legal field is faced with a “paucity of empirical information”
and thus must “fall back on armchair hunches about the likely effects of
various rules and procedures.”22 Data on the criminal justice system’s
wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals could allow us to assess: (a)
whether the actual ratio between wrongful convictions and wrongful
acquittals accords with the Blackstone principle; and (b) whether the total
number of erroneous verdicts overburdens the criminal justice system.
However, such data is difficult if not impossible to come by. 23 As Keith A.
Findley describes:

19

See, e.g., Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1163 (2003); ALEX
STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 172–213 (2005); Richard L. Lippke, Punishing the
Guilty, not Punishing the Innocent, 7 J. MORAL PHILOSOPHY 462 (2010); Youngjae Lee,
Deontology, Political Morality, and the State, 8 OHIO ST. CRIM. L. 385 (2011); Alec Walen,
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account, LA. L. REV. 355
(2015).
20 For a more detailed discussion, see Part III-B.
21 For a more detailed discussion, see Part III-B.
22 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 8. Note: For his
estimates on wrongful acquittals, Laudan relied primarily on Harry Kalven and Hans
Zeisel’s 1966 study of judge and jury agreement and disagreement. HARRY KALVEN &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8-9 (1971). For example, turning to Kalven and Zeisel’s
study, Laudan notes the rate at which judges would have convicted when juries acquitted,
which Kalven and Zeisel found to be about 17% of the criminal cases. Laudan further notes
that, among the cases included in Kalven and Zeisel’s study, the judges reported that they
believed that only about 15% of the acquittals were clear acquittals, and 85% were close
cases. Laudan then takes at face value that this means that the close cases—85% of the
acquittals— “are close enough to warrant an assumption that these are probably factually
guilty defendants.” See LARRY LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS: RETHINKING TRIAL AND
ERRORS? 58–59 (2016) [Hereinafter LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS]. Such an analysis is not
logically rigorous.
23 See Keith A. Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL
L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2018).
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Only in the exoneration context do we sometimes have the
ability to discover error, through the production of new
evidence of innocence (especially DNA evidence). This tells
us that error does occur, and does so at above a trivial level,
which can help us understand the conditions and
contributing factors that can lead to false positives. It cannot,
however, tell us a rate. For false negatives (false acquittals),
. . . we do not even have that.24
In the absence of direct data, this article proposes a novel empirical
formula, maybe the only one in existence, to approximate the effect of the
BARD standard in practice through the lens of indirect, but statistically
available, data on acquittals, reversals, and non-prosecutions. Our
foundational assumption is that the more effective the BARD standard is in
restraining wrongful convictions, the more that the “unobservable” number of
wrongful convictions will decline, while the observable number of acquittals,
reversals, and non-prosecutions will rise, and vice versa. Unfortunately, even
with the turn to indirect data, the possible real-world laboratories for empirical
observation are exceedingly limited. Such a study needs a clear benchmark
date on which the BARD standard was implemented in (or removed from) a
given criminal justice system, as well as some length of time both pre- and
post-benchmark, from which to collect data. Moreover, all other (non-BARD)
factors would need to remain relatively stable throughout the entire period of
observation. Without this combination of a clear benchmark date and a ceteris
paribus environment, even empirical analysis on the indirect but observable
data is largely impossible.25
The solution to this dilemma of how to investigate the BARD
standard empirically presented itself, surprisingly, not in a common law
country—where BARD has been in place for more than two centuries and no
clear benchmark date exists—but in the civil law country of China. As with
other civil law countries, China developed a criminal standard of proof
different from that of BARD; however, in 2013, China officially adopted the
BARD standard—complementing its existing standard of proof, “reliable and
sufficient evidence”—in a move that otherwise left the legal system
unchanged.26 This development offers the necessary “kicker” for our study,
allowing us to observe changes in acquittal, reversal, and non-prosecution
24

Id. at 1275 (emphasis added).
Note: Ceteris paribus is a Latin phrase that means “all other things being equal” or “all
other things being normal.” For a detailed discussion on this notion, see Johan van
Benthem, Patrick Girard, & Oliver Roy, Everything Else Being Equal: A Modal Logic for
Ceteris Paribus Preferences, 38 J. PHILOS. LOGIC 83, 84 (2009).
26 See Zongzhi Long, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” in the Chinese Legal Context, 1
PEKING U. L.J. 339 (2014).
25
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rates after the benchmark date and thus extrapolate the effect of the BARD
standard in restraining wrongful convictions. Using data that has been made
available as part of China’s move toward judicial transparency and
digitalization of court files nationwide, we conducted a series of analyses with
simple regression and fixed effect models to draw further insights on the effect
of the BARD standard in the Chinese criminal justice system.27
Our study shows that, although implementation of the BARD
standard in the Chinese criminal justice system has been generally helpful in
restraining wrongful convictions, this effect is limited. Instead, the BARD
standard and the “reliable and sufficient evidence” standard have been
effectively treated as the same in practice. This finding suggests that the
BARD standard itself is not all powerful or indispensable (it is not, in the end,
magical).
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I examines the myth of the
BARD standard, including its disputed origins and definition. We suggest that
the BARD standard is like Mona Lisa’s smile, deadly attractive but
ambiguous. In Parts II and III, we examine the highs and lows of the BARD
standard, respectively: on the one hand, it is constitutionally based and is an
essential tool to restrain wrongful convictions; on the other hand, it is
surrounded by confusion and can lead to both excessive wrongful acquittals
and pressure on overall accuracy of trial outcomes. Part IV introduces our
empirical approach on studying the effect of the BARD standard in restraining
wrongful convictions, after which Part V presents the Chinese case study.
Finally, Part VI concludes our findings that how the formal standard of proof
is phrased may not matter very much. Words effectively cannot describe the
standard adequately.
I.

THE MYTH OF “PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT”

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt (BARD) is a fundamental
requirement of Anglo-American criminal law and other common law
systems.28 And yet, the standard is plagued by imprecision and a lack of
27

For a more detailed discussion, see Part V-D.
See Alec Walen, Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account,
76 LA. L. REV. 355, 356, 363 (2015) (“The standard of proof for criminal convictions in
the United States—and in many other jurisdictions—is proof beyond a reasonable doubt….
The English-speaking world fully embraces the BARD standard, and is joined by a growing
swath of Western Europe, including Germany, Sweden, and most recently, Italy.”); see
also Thomas V. Mulrine, Reasonable Doubt: How in the World is It Defined?, 12 AM. U.
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 195, 214-18 (1997) (Australia, Canada, and the U.K.); Warren Young,
Neil Cameron, & Yvette Tinsley, Juries in Criminal Trials, Part Two, 54 (N.Z. Law
28
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clarity, with even its origins disputed. We begin our discussion with an
examination of the contested origins and definition of BARD.
A. The unsettled origin of the reasonable doubt standard
Many researchers would agree on at least two points regarding the
birth of the BARD standard: first, it has ancient roots, with classical Roman
law and medieval canon law requiring a high standard of proof in criminal
cases for the protection of innocent defendants;29 and second, it crystallized
at the end of the eighteenth century,30 with the earliest use of the precise
phrase appearing in the Boston Massacre trials of 1770.31 However, what
happened between these two nodes on the timeline remains unclear; at least
three schools of thought exist on this issue.
A leading viewpoint, known as the “Received View” 32 and
represented most ably by scholars Barbara Shapiro and Anthony Morano,
among others, is that the reasonable doubt standard evolved from the common
law jury trial system that spawned in England during the twelfth century.33 In
Comm’n, Preliminary Paper No. 37, 1999) (N. Z.); Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 §
105A(2)(a)(i) (S. Afr.).
29 See, e.g., Shealy, supra note 11, at 269–70 (“Shortly after AD 382, when Christianity
had been declared the official faith of the Roman Empire, the emperors ruled that a verdict
could only be had if it was based on ‘indubitable evidence’ (Indiciis Indubitatis). . . . By
the early ninth century, the canon lawyers also required a high standard of proof. Following
the Gospel of Matthew, they demanded evidence that was ‘clear as the noon-day sun’ (luce
meridiana clarior).” [Italics added]).
30 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW: DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 696–97 (2009).
31 See id. at 697; Morano, supra note 10, at 508. But see May, supra note 10, at 656 (noting
that Earlier historical literature long focused on a series of treason trials in Ireland in 1798
as the first appearance of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.). It is worth noting
that in the Boston Massacre trials of 1770, the reasonable doubt standard was urged by
prosecutors who were trying to lower their burden of persuasion from an often unattainable
task of having to persuade the jury beyond all doubt, an unusual way of using the standard
from today’s perspective. In contrast, in the Irish Treason Cases in 1798, the reasonable
doubt standard was urged by defense lawyers who were endeavoring to raise the
prosecution’s burden of persuasion, which is in accordance with common practices
nowadays. See Newman, supra note 9, at 981-982.
32 Note: the phrase “Received View” captures the emphasis of this theory on the origin of
BARD: toward the end of the Middle Ages, the common law jury underwent its epochal
transformation from active neighborhood investigators to passive triers of fact who
received and evaluated evidence presented at trial. See Shealy, supra note 11, at 271–77.
33 See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND “R EASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 3
(1991) (tracing the development of the reasonable doubt standard); Barbara J. Shapiro, “To
a Moral Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 153, 155 (1986); Morano, supra note 10, at 507; see also Theodore
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the medieval era of intensely interdependent agricultural communities in
England, jurors were drawn from neighborhoods near the contested events.34
The norm was that a jury of the locality would contain witness-like persons
who would know most of the facts by themselves, or if not, that these jurors
would at least be well positioned to investigate the facts on their own (a “selfinforming jury”).35 “The medieval jury came to court not to listen, but to
speak, not to hear evidence but to deliver a verdict formulated in advance.” 36
In contrast, medieval judges knew significantly less about the facts of cases
adjudicated than did the jurors, and judges accepted this “rough verdict [ ]
without caring to investigate the logical processes [of the jury decisionmaking], if logical they were, of which that verdict was the outcome.” 37
Toward the end of the medieval era, due to societal expansion, the volume of
both civil and criminal cases surged.38 Jurors no longer did their own
investigations; nor did they always have sufficient personal knowledge of the
defendant to make decisions without hearing additional evidence or testimony
from witnesses.39
As more and more jurors became passive viewers of fact and
increasingly relied on witnesses and documents presented at trial that had to
be evaluated for truthfulness and accuracy (under the “progressive
dethronement of the jury”),40 it became necessary to develop standards of
evaluation by which jurors could test and weigh evidence. This process of
developing “jury control”41 marks the beginning of the formal “reasonable

Waldman, Origins of the Legal Doctrine of Reasonable Doubt, 20 J. HIST. IDEAS 299
(1959); Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the
Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1165, 1165-169 (2003).
34 See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1996).
35 See James Bradley Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 295, 302–
05 (1892) (“From the beginning of our records, we find cases, in a dispute over the
genuineness of a deed, where the jury are combined with the witnesses to the deed.”).
36 See Langbein, supra note 34, at 1170.
37 See FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC M AITLAND, THE HISTORY OF E NGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I 660-61 (2d ed. 1898).
38 See Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 145
(2003) (“Undoubtedly, increased mobility and other social changes played a large role.”).
39 See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND “R EASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 4
(1991); Langbein, supra note 34, at 1170–71; Thayer, supra note 35, at 305 (“As late,
certainly, as 1489. . . . [] we find witnesses to deeds still summoned with the jury. I know
of no later case.”).
40 See A. W. B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533, 600 (1979).
41 See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND “R EASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 6
(1991); see also LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 698.
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doubt” rule in England.42 The articulation of the BARD standard of proof was
part of a “broader phenomenon of increasingly detailed judicial instructions
to the jury, which had the effect of transforming into ‘law’ matters that had
previously been remitted to jury discretion.”43
Influenced by the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century and
the Enlightenment in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “philosophers
and jurists [in England] came to realize that in [juridical proof and other]
human affairs (as opposed, say, to mathematics or logic), no full certainty was
to be had.” The next best thing, according to such philosophers as John Locke
and John Wilkins, was what they called “moral certainty,” a standard of proof
that was short of absolute certainty but more precise than mere opinion, and
that had evolved from religious and scientific arguments concerning proof. 44
Laudan noted that these philosophers “dubbed this sort of certainty as
‘moral,’ not because it had anything to do with ethics or morality but because
they wanted to contrast it with ‘mathematical’ certainty of the sort
traditionally associated with rigorous demonstration. Morally certain beliefs
could not be proven beyond all doubt, but they were nonetheless firm and
settled truths, supported by [adequate evidence].”45 Although in theory they
were open to the doubt of skeptics, such beliefs were firm enough that
reasonable men, employing their senses and rational faculties, would not
doubt them in practice.46 Laudan further noted that, “[f]rom this [notion of
moral certainty] arose the [precise] notion that a guilty verdict required the
jury to believe ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ [(BARD)] in the guilt of the
accused.”47
A second school of thought on the origin of the BARD standard holds
that “the reasonable doubt formula was originally concerned” not with
protecting the innocent from conviction, but “with protecting the souls of the
jurors against damnation.”48 James Whitman, the leading scholar on this
theological line of thought, describes it as follows:
[C]onvicting an innocent defendant was regarded, in the
older Christian tradition, as a potential mortal sin. The
42 BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, B EYOND “REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 6 (1991).
43

See LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 698.
LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 32–33; see BARBARA J.
SHAPIRO, BEYOND “REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE” 7 (1991).
45 LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 33.
46 Id.
47
Id; see also Barbara J. Shapiro, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: The Neglected EighteenthCentury Context, 8 LAW & HUMAN. 19 (2014) (arguing that the concepts “moral certainty”
and “beyond a reasonable doubt” mean the same thing and that beyond reasonable doubt
language was to be found earlier in fields other than law.).
48 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE D OUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL 2-4 (2008).
44
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reasonable doubt rule was one of many rules and procedures
that developed in response to this disquieting possibility. It
was originally a theological doctrine, intended to reassure
jurors that they could convict the defendant without risking
their own salvation, so long as their doubts about guilt were
not “reasonable.” . . . As we shall see, medieval and early
modern Christians experienced great anxiety about the
dangers that acts of judgment presented for the soul. . . . The
story of the reasonable doubt rule is simply an English
chapter in this long history of safer way theology, a history
in which Christian theologians worried for centuries over the
nature of judging, over the problems of doubt. . . .49
According to Whitman, “[j]urors in medieval England were simply terrified
to [render a] conviction.”50 “The ‘reasonable doubt’ standard developed so
that English jurors could, in fact, [convict defendants] in appropriate cases.”51
The standard “arose in the face of this religiously motivated reluctance to
convict, taking its now-familiar form during the 1780s. It is still with us today,
a living fossil from an older moral world.”52
Finally, the third view on the origin of the BARD standard has been
voiced by legal historian John Langbein, who notes that before the last quarter
of the eighteenth century, when the BARD standard crystallized, many Old
Bailey53 cases in England seemed impossible to square with a high standard
of proof.54 The Sessions Papers55 report on many eighteenth-century and
49

Id. at 2–4 (emphasis added).

at 3 (“[M]edieval and early modern Christians experienced
great anxiety about the dangers that acts of judgment presented for the soul [of the
judge].”); Shealy, supra note 11, at 279.
51 See Shealy, supra note 11, at 279.
52 See WHITMAN, supra note 48, at 4 (emphasis added).
53 The Central Criminal Court of England and Wales is commonly referred to as the “Old
Bailey.”.
54 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 261–62 (2003)
[hereinafter LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL]; See also LANGBEIN
ET AL, supra note 30, at 696–98.
55 “Sessions Papers are chronologically organised files of documents relating to the work
of local magistrates’ courts (named as “Justices of the Peace”) [in England and Wales]. . .
. They include several different types of documents, relating to the prosecution of
criminals, the administration of poor relief and the settlement laws, and other aspects of
local government. The documents, which can be in rough draft or final form, were
generated primarily by the Justices’ clerks, but also by Justices of Peace [judges]
themselves, as well as by parish officers, litigants, accused criminals, and paupers.” See
Sessions Papers: Justices’ Working Documents (PS), LONDON LIVES,
https://www.londonlives.org/static/PS.jsp#:~:text=Sessions%20Papers%20are%20chrono
logically%20organised,the%20clerk%20of%20the%20peace. (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
50 See WHITMAN, supra note 48,

132

GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L.

[Vol. 50:119

earlier criminal cases in which the prosecution was not able to prove a case
against the accused, but the accused was still convicted through a partial
verdict, mitigation, or recommendation of mercy.56 English sources of the
early eighteenth century, just decades before the precise notion of the BARD
standard emerged, reveal that the assumption “was not that [the accused] was
innocent until the case against him was proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
but that if he were innocent he ought to be able to demonstrate it for the jury
by the quality and character of his reply to the prosecutor’s evidence.”57 In the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, just as the BARD standard
emerged and gained popularity, the adversarial criminal process experienced
rapid development in England,58 suggesting that the emergence of the BARD
standard was related in some way to the growing presence and influence of
defense lawyers in criminal trials. For example, in the Irish Treason Cases in
1798, defense lawyers were the first to urge the BARD standard on the courts,
in an attempt to raise the prosecution’s burden of persuasion.59 Even though
he cannot conclude just how the emergence of the BARD standard was related
to the growing lawyerization of Old Bailey trials in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century,60 Langbein finds that the rise of the adversary criminal
trial may indeed have affected the development of the BARD standard of
proof in different ways; “for example, by disposing the judges to . . . further
safeguard against the failings of the adversary procedure.”61 By “setting a high
standard of proof and instructing the jury about it, [the judges] directed the
attention of the jury toward any weaknesses of the prosecution’s case, and
away from the focus of the old altercation trial, which was on how well the
defendant answered the charges and the accusing evidence.”62
So, who is right and who is wrong here regarding the origin and early
development of the BARD standard of proof? Our view is that the three
schools of thought are all legitimate; they just observe the same subject from
different perspectives. The origin and early development of the BARD
standard were ultimately complicated and multilayered, unlikely to be fully
explained by any single theory.

56

See LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 696–98.
See J. M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, 341 (1986)
(emphasis added).
58 See LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 452.
59 See May, supra note 10, at 656–57, quoted in CHARLES MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§321, at 682 n.3 (1st ed. 1954); see also Newman, supra note 9, at 981–82.
60
For instance, the Sessions Papers, Langbein’s major source for research on this matter,
do not indicate that the defense counsel played much role in the development of the BARD
standard in 1780s England. See LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL,
supra note 54, at 265.
61 See id. (emphasis added).
62 See LANGBEIN ET AL, supra note 30, at 698.
57
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B. The unclear definition of the reasonable doubt standard
The mystery surrounding the BARD standard does not stop with its
origins. Perhaps more surprising—if also more well known among the legal
community—is that the mystery extends to the BARD standard’s very
definition, which remains ambiguous despite the standard’s central role in the
criminal justice system. People have seemingly become accustomed to such
unclarity, as “many judges [are] inclined to the view that the less said by way
of explanation of this [reasonable doubt] standard, the better.”63
This unclarity was not always the case. From the late nineteenth
century to the second half of the twentieth century, the common law world
widely recognized a singular definition of “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.”64 This definition was delivered by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Webster65 in
1850, and stated:
Then, what is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used,
probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is
not merely possible doubt; because every thing relating to
human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case,
63

See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 34.
See 9 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE § 2497 (Chadbourn rev. 3d ed. 1981) (“From time to
time, various efforts have been made to define more in detail this elusive and undefinable
state of mind. One that has received frequent sanction and has been quoted innumerable
times is that of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, on the trial of Dr. Webster for the
murder of Mr. Parkman. . . .”); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
LAW 76 (5th ed. 2009) (“Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
crafted the traditional definition of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt,’ which served for more
than a century as the basis for many reasonable doubt jury instructions.”). But see LAUDAN,
TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 34 (“Although language [of Justice
Shaw] to this effect became standard by the late-nineteenth century, judges would often
expand on and embellish Shaw’s phraseology. Sometimes they would say that a belief was
true beyond reasonable doubt when it was ‘highly probable’ or when the jurors had an
‘abiding conviction’ about it, or when their ‘consciences were satisfied’ that conviction
was the right thing to do. But even in those early days of the BARD rule, many judges
inclined to the view that the less said by way of explanation of this relatively new standard,
the better.”).
65 Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1850). Coincidentally or not,
it is interesting to observe that seventy years after the earliest use of the precise phrase
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” appeared in the Boston Massacre trials of 1770, the
first widely recognized definition of this standard also emerged from Boston,
Massachusetts.
64
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which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all
the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is
upon the prosecutor. All the presumptions of law
independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every
person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty.
If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal. For it
is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong
one arising from the doctrine of chances, that the fact
charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but the
evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable
and moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs
the understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment, of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we
take to be proof beyond reasonable doubt. . . .66
Justice Shaw was in concurrence with the “Received View,” which
equates proof beyond a reasonable doubt with moral certainty. Notably, in his
explanation, Justice Shaw combined this standard of proof with a cluster of
other defendant-friendly rules, namely the prosecutorial burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, and the benefit of doubt, all of which are
cornerstones of the criminal justice system.67 What he did here is an
application of the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: the expression “beyond a
reasonable doubt” draws meaning and clarity from the associated rules
mentioned in the same instruction. Maybe that helps explain why Shaw’s
definition of the BARD standard was considered to be thorough and
convincing for upward of a century.
This definition only lasted until 1994, when the Supreme Court of the
United States negated Shaw’s definition in the case of Victor v. Nebraska,
holding that his terminology is archaic, unhelpful, and misleading. 68 The
condemnation of the Court in Victor focused on Shaw’s reference to “moral
certainty,” the same phrase that had shepherded the BARD standard’s

66

Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
Id. at 320. See e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of
Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 457 (1989) (“The presumption has been called the
'golden thread' that runs throughout the criminal law, heralded as the 'cornerstone of AngloSaxon justice,' and identified as the 'focal point of any concept of due process.' Indeed, the
presumption has become so central to the popular view of the criminal justice system, it
has taken on 'some of the characteristics of superstition.'”).
68 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994).
67
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evolution in the age of Enlightenment.69 The Court opined: “[t]he risk that
jurors would understand ‘moral certainty’ to authorize convictions based in
part on value judgments regarding the defendant’s behavior is particularly
high in cases where the defendant is alleged to have committed a repugnant
or brutal crime.”70 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, writing for the Court, said
emphatically that “this Court does not condone the use of the antiquated
‘moral certainty’ phrase. . . .”71 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg ventured that
“the phrase ‘moral certainty’, though not so misleading as to render the
instructions [to jurors] unconstitutional, should be avoided as unhelpful in
defining reasonable doubt. . . .”72 Even Justice Harry Blackmun, writing in a
dissent, stated that there exists “the real possibility that such language would
lead jurors reasonably to believe that they could base their decision to convict
upon moral standards or emotion in addition to or instead of evidentiary
standards.”73 In a nutshell, the Court in Victor noted that “‘moral certainty,’
standing alone, might not be recognized by modern jurors as a synonym for
‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’”74
The Supreme Court of the United States in Victor noted what is not
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” disconnecting BARD from “moral
certainty,” a phrase that once grounded the concept and linked it to its
philosophical origins.75 However, it did not elaborate on what BARD is.76
Here, it is worth noting that the phrase “moral certainty” means quite different things in
Justice Shaw’s definition of BARD (the version of the Enlightenment era) from its usage
in the definitional rejection made by the Court in Victor. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 13–15
(“We are somewhat more concerned with Sandoval’s argument that the phrase ‘moral
certainty’ has lost its historical meaning, and that a modern jury would understand it to
allow conviction on proof that does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Words and phrases can change meaning over time: A passage generally understood in 1850
may be incomprehensible or confusing to a modern juror. . . . [M]oral certainty would be
understood by modern jurors to mean a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable
doubt.”); see also Shealy, supra note 11, at 245.
70 Victor, 511 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
69

72

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
74 Id. at 14.
75 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 35.
76 But note: Justice Ginsburg did offer a definition of the BARD standard in her
concurrence in Victor. She advocated the proposed definition as set forth by the Federal
Judicial Center. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 26–27. The proposed definition of reasonable doubt
by the Federal Judicial Center is as follows:
73

[T]he government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in
civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that
a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the
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Maybe that was because the Supreme Court was not yet ready to launch such
a definition, or because it believed that the concept is quite self-explanatory.
Or maybe the Court deliberately avoided clarifying the definition of BARD
in order to keep the standard flexible for dealing with situations of varying
complexity and to defer some discretionary power of interpretation to the
jurors in individual cases. No matter what the reason was, the inaction of the
Supreme Court of the United States in defining BARD has caused confusion
among lower courts and beyond in interpreting the standard of proof in
criminal cases, as shown in various, inconsistent explications in jury
instructions.77
Among the various efforts to interpret BARD, one unofficial
interpretation has gained ground for being straightforward, easy to
understand, heuristically sensible, and popular among the general public. That
interpretation involves seeing “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” as a
mathematically high probability, a number toward the high end on a scale that
ranges from 0 to 1 (i.e., from 0 percent to 100 percent). 78 One obvious
inspiration for this approach is found in the commonly used interpretation of
the civil law standard of proof: preponderance of evidence. That is normally
taken to mean that the trier of fact should favor the plaintiff over the defendant
in a civil case if the case of the plaintiff is, more likely than not. That is, if it
government’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There
are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty,
and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes
every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence,
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there
is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit
of the doubt and find him not guilty.”
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1987) (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg was unable to convince any other justices to join her. The
recommendations of the Federal Judicial Center remain just that, recommendations. See
Shealy, supra note 11, at 251–53.
77 See, e.g., Shealy, supra note 11, at 254–68 (“[Victor] did not bring closure or clarity to
the lower courts; difficulties around. One finds a polyglot of definitions, terms, and
rationales. Federal and state courts tolerate a wide variety of instructions on ‘reasonable
doubt.’ Even those courts which prefer not to define ‘reasonable doubt’ will, on occasion,
tolerate substantial differences among trial judges who attempt to do so.”). For example,
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits upheld their district courts’ refusals to define “reasonable
doubt” even upon request by a defendant. In contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have
model jury instructions defining reasonable doubt.
78 For one of the earliest articles discussing quantification of standards of proof in juridical
fact-finding, see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L.
REV. 1065 (1968).
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has a probability greater than 0.5 (i.e., 50 percent).79 The criminal standard,
of course, is meant to be much higher than the civil standard, so the relevant
probabilities would have to be much higher for conviction (0.9 or 0.95 are
commonly cited unofficial estimates).80
We agree that this probability-based approach makes intuitive sense.
As the BARD standard recognizes, we cannot be completely certain (a
probability of 1.0) about anything to do with human affairs or the guilt of an
accused party. This impossibility invites the suggestion that the standard of
proof for conviction be defined as a threshold probability, a numerical degree
of confidence in the party’s guilt on the part of triers of fact.81 However, in
practice, most trial judges would hesitate (if not immediately refuse) to adopt
this numerical approach in jury instructions due to an inherent problem: any
specification of a degree of belief necessary for a finding of guilt involves an
explicit admission that wrongful convictions will inevitably occur.82 For
instance, a confidence of 95 percent in the guilt of the accused would generally
suggest that as many as one in every twenty innocent defendants will be
wrongly convicted. As Larry Laudan neatly describes in his book Truth,
Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology:
While acknowledging in the abstract that no method of proof
is infallible and thus admitting in principle that mistakes will
occur from time to time, the judiciary has an entrenched
resistance to any explicit admission that the system has a
built-in tolerance for wrongful convictions. . . . What should
be clear is that identifying BARD with any level of
probability less than unity would explicitly acknowledge
that the system officially condones a certain fraction of
79

See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 44. But see Edward
K. Cheng & Michael S. Pardo, Accuracy, Optimality, and the Preponderance Standard, 14
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 193 (2015) (arguing the traditional probability understanding
of the civil standard of proof, above 0.5, is a mistake. One hypothesis can be more probable
than a competing hypothesis—that is, supported by the preponderance of the available
evidence—even if the former hypothesis falls short of the 0.5 threshold.).
80 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 44.
81 Id.
82 See generally Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of
Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 530 (1989); Daniel Shaviro, A Response to Professor Callen,
65 TUL. L. REV. 499 (1991) (Professor Shaviro made the point that in the past legal
professionals had been “squeamish” about frankly acknowledging the fact that they
implicitly tolerate some wrongful verdicts.). But see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–
26 (1958) (“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of
transcending value – as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as
to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden . . . of persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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wrongful convictions. That, in turn, would supposedly
threaten the ordinary person’s faith in the justice system.
Better, it seems, to avoid any talk of probability as the
standard for conviction than to acknowledge publicly that
the system expressly permits incorrect judgments of guilt.83
In addition, even if the worries about the broader social message
being sent by the use of probabilities could be quelled, people disagree about
what number on the scale of probabilities should or could be assigned to
BARD.84 Therefore, even if BARD, as a numerical high probability, makes
intuitive sense, it is controversial and indeterminable in practice.
Another problem here is that the law applies burdens of persuasion
like the BARD standard to individual elements, not to causes of action as a
whole.85 So, even if people agreed to narrow down the BARD standard to a
range of high probabilities (e.g., 0.9–0.95), the application of burdens of
persuasion would yield the conjunction paradox of proof.86 If, for example,
four independent elements are each proved to a 0.9 probability, the probability
of them all being true is only about 0.66, which does not sound like proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trouble of considering BARD as a mathematically high
probability goes even further. As Brian Leiter and Ronald J. Allen stated in
their article Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence:
The expected utility theorist may respond by criticizing the
law and arguing that it is the conjunction of elements that
should be found to a specific level. This, too, yields
unacceptable consequences, by making the level of proof of

83

LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 45–46.
See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409–10 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 603 F.2d
1053 (2d Cir. 1970) (Judge Jack B. Weinstein described a survey he did on his colleagues’
different understandings of the probability equivalents of the various standards of proof.).
Also see Kaplan, supra note 80, at 1073–74 (“Probably the most important reason why we
do not attempt to express reasonable doubt in terms of quantitative odds, however, is that
in any rational system the utilities (or disutilities) that determine the necessary probability
of guilt will vary with the crime for which the defendant is being tried, and indeed with the
particular defendant. In a criminal trial, as in any decision process, we must consider the
utilities associated with differing decisions of the particular case at issue-not ties over many
disparate types of criminal cases.”).
85
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (". . . the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.") (emphasis added).
86 See, Michael S. Pardo, The Paradoxes of Legal Proof: A Critical Guide, 99 B.U. L. REV.
233, 266–81 (2019); Ronald J. Allen, Artificial Intelligence and the Evidentiary Process:
The Challenges of Formalism and Computation, 9 A.I. & L. 99, 109 (2001).
84

2021]

LIFTING THE VEIL OF MONA LISA

139

specific elements turn on the fortuity of the number of
elements in a cause of action. Take the example of theft and
murder. Theft has considerably more elements than murder.
To convict for theft requires on average that intent to steal
be established to a higher probability than intent to kill for a
murder conviction. This strikes all legal observers as both
unacceptable and absurd. . . .87
In essence, the idea that proof beyond a reasonable doubt might be seen as a
mathematically high probability may have great heuristic value, but it likely
can never become an official explanation or definition of the BARD standard.
At the end of the day, people have mixed feelings about this standard. On the
one hand, this standard has been almost uniformly accepted as the standard of
proof for criminal cases in numerous legal systems for a long period of time;
on the other hand, as Erik Lillquist has said, “what the standard really requires
and why we use it at all both remain unclear.”88 Researchers still disagree on
its origin, and the precise meaning of BARD remains elusive. Like Leonardo
da Vinci’s famous portrait Mona Lisa, no matter how many times we view
this vivid painting, we just cannot get enough of her ambiguous smile and we
strive ceaselessly to understand it. Based on this context, to better understand
the reasonable doubt standard, we decided to take a closer look at its highs
and lows.
II.

GLORIES OF THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been accepted in many different
criminal justice systems as the proper formula to set out the standard of proof
and deemed as one of the most fundamental requirements in law. But why is
BARD treated as the golden standard? We identified two holy auras
surrounding it. First, in the United States, proof of a criminal charge beyond
a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required, since the accused in a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance (e.g., his or her good
name, freedom, or even life), which triggers protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. And second, the BARD standard is widely
considered to reflect the Blackstone principle (a foundational maxim in
common law countries and beyond), which states that convicting an innocent

87

Brian Leiter & Ronald J. Allen, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV. 1491, 1504–05 (2001) (emphasis added).
88 See Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtue of
Variability, 36 UC DAVIS L. REV. 85, 87 (2002).
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person is much worse than acquitting a guilty person.89 We will take a closer
look at each of these glories of BARD in turn.
A. The reasonable doubt standard as constitutionally required in
criminal cases
In the United States, the BARD standard has been widely used in both
state and federal courts by custom and common law precedent since the midnineteenth century,90 and the Supreme Court discussed reasonable doubt in a
series of cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 91 For
example, in Miles v. United States (1880), the Court found no error in the trial
court’s jury instruction of this case: “The prisoner’s guilt must be established
beyond reasonable doubt.”92 In Coffin v. United States (1895), the Court held
that:
[I]t is the duty of the judge, in all jurisdictions, when
requested, and in some when not requested, to explain [the
presumption of innocence] to the jury in his charge. The
usual formula in which this doctrine is expressed is that
every man is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.93
Nonetheless, it was not until In re Winship in 1970 that the Supreme Court
formally constitutionalized the BARD standard.94
In Winship, for the first time, the Court explicitly held that “the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.”95 To support this holding, the majority opinion of the
89

Daniel Epps, One Last Word on the Blackstone Principle. 102 VA. L. REV. 34, 35
(2016).
90 See, Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850); Commonwealth v. Costley,
118 Mass. 1, 16 (1875).
91 See, Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S.
432, 452–53 (1895); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Holt v. United
States, 218 US. 245, 253 (1910); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569–70 (1914).
92 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 309 (1880).
93 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 495 (1895).
94 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
95
Id. at 364 (emphasis added). Note: The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall
be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Fifth
Amendment applies this limitation to the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes the same restriction on the States. Here in Winship, because the issue
presented before the Court was whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required during
the adjudicatory stage in the New York Family Court where a juvenile was charged with
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Winship Court, delivered by Justice William Brennan, illustrated two points.
First, based on a long history and virtually unanimous adherence to the
reasonable-doubt standard in common law jurisdictions, “expressions in many
[earlier] opinions of this Court indicated that it has long been assumed that
proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required.”96 Second, the majority opinion in Winship stated:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
interests of immense importance, both because of the
possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name
and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man
for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt
about this guilt. . . . “Due process commands that no man
shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the
burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.” To this
end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it
“impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a
subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.”97
an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, it was more about the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the Court of Winship, when
holding BARD standard of proof in criminal trials is required by the Due Process Clause
(“DP”), did not further discuss about DP of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments separately.
96 Id. at 361–63 (emphasis added). Here, the majority opinion of the Winship Court listed
a number of supporting cases previously adjudicated in the Supreme Court of the United
States and quoted lines in opinions of three particular cases of the Court to demonstrate
that BARD standard in criminal trials has a constitutional root: Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S.
790, 802–03 (1952) (dissenting opinion) (“It is the duty of the Government to establish . .
. guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion – basic in our law and rightly one of the
boasts of a free society – is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the
historic, procedural content of ‘due process’.”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
174 (1949) (“Guilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common law tradition, to some
extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with
that standard. These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to
safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life,
liberty and property.”); and Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (“[The
requirement is implicit in] constitutions . . . [which] recognize the fundamental principles
that are deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty.”).
97
In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363-64 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26
(1958) (emphasis added)) (quoting Norman Dorsen and Daniel Rezneck, In Re Gault and
the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAM. L. Q. 1, 26 (1967)). But see Lawrence Rosenthal,
Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 160
(2010) (“[D]ue process has always concerned itself with protection of the innocent, but it
accommodates society’s interest in maintaining reasonably practicable means for
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This historical interpretation of the BARD standard together with the
argument about its link to the Due Process Clause was creative: the
Constitution of the United States neither explicitly addresses the standard of
proof in criminal trials nor mentions reasonable doubt,98 as Justice Hugo
Black pointed out in his dissent in Winship.99 Still, the Court opinion in
Winship went further in defending BARD, declaring it to be not just
constitutionally but also ethically warranted, a prime instrument for reducing
adjudicative errors (wrongful convictions). In his concurrence, Justice John
Harlan put Winship at the very heart of the modern Court’s “reasonable doubt”
jurisprudence:
[T]he choice of the standard for a particular variety of
adjudication does, I think, reflect a very fundamental
assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous
factual determinations.100 . . . I view the requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on
a fundamental value determination of our society that it is
far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man
go free.101
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Winship embedded a significant amount of
information regarding adjudicative errors and relied on a social creed that has
ancient roots as well as famous interpretations in history: the Blackstone
principle. To understand this principle, we need to first understand the concept
of error distribution.

punishing the guilty as well. It is a small wonder that the Court has been reluctant to use
the Due Process Clause to impose novel procedural reforms even when they have the
potential to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions.”) (emphasis added).
98 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 34.
99 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 358 (“[Contrary to the majority opinion of this case], the
Court has never clearly held, however, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is either
expressly or impliedly commanded by any provision of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights,
which in my view is made fully applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment . . .
does by express language provide for, among other things, a right to counsel in criminal
trials, a right to indictment, and the right of a defendant to be informed of the nature of the
charges against him. And in two places the Constitution provides for trial by jury, but
nowhere in that document is there any statement that conviction of crime requires proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 370.
101 Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
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B. The reasonable doubt standard as an essential tool to restrain
wrongful convictions
From an epistemic point of view, there are four, and only four,
possibilities with respect to the result of a criminal case adjudicated: correct
conviction (a wrongdoer being found guilty), correct acquittal (an innocent
person being found not guilty), wrongful conviction (an innocent person being
found guilty), and wrongful acquittal (a wrongdoer being found not guilty, or
escaping from punishment through ways other than a formal trial).102 A core
aim (and, some scholars103 argue, the primary purpose) of any criminal justice
system is the “[r]ectitude of decision,”104 meaning the correct application of
substantive law to the true facts, thus making truthful verdicts (epistemically
correct convictions and correct acquittals) and avoiding false verdicts
(wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals). In this article, we phrase this
aim as the “first goal of criminal justice”—error reduction.105 Here, the term
error is used in a purely epistemic sense, unlike the procedural errors often
mentioned by appellate courts.106
And yet, triers of fact will sometimes, despite their best efforts, be
wrong in their factual conclusions of the case at issue, namely finding an
innocent person guilty or a wrongdoer not guilty, thus making wrongful
convictions and wrongful acquittals, respectively.107 In that case, the question
Note: here, we use the phrase “wrongful acquittal” to include events that are not an
acquittal per se (a formal trial verdict of not guilty) but that represent other kinds of failure
by the justice system to impose punishment on a wrongdoer whom authorities initially and
correctly identified as guilty, such as a prosecutor’s decision not to press charges after an
arrest or a judge’s order dismissing an indictment.
103 See, e.g., LAUDAN, THE LAW’S FLAWS, supra note 22; Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan,
Why Do We Convict As Many Innocent People as We Do?: Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 65, 65 (2008).
104 See WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 14–16
(1985).
105 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1.
106 For a higher or appellate court, an “error” occurs in a trial when some rule of evidence
or procedure has been violated, misinterpreted, or misapplied. A trial can avoid such
“errors” by scrupulously following the letter of the current rules governing the
admissibility of evidence and procedures. This process, however, is no guarantee of an
epistemically correct outcome (with the truly guilty and the truly innocent being correctly
identified). For the purpose of our discussion, an error occurs when a materially (i.e., truly)
innocent person is deemed guilty (named as “false positive”) or when a materially guilty
person fails to be found guilty (named as “false negative”). By the same token, for the
purpose of our discussion, the phrase “correct verdict” means an epistemically or materially
correct verdict, not a procedurally correct one, even though these two concepts are
overlapping (a procedurally correct verdict may very likely also be an epistemically correct
one).
107 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
102
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arises of which type of error—a wrongful conviction (false positive) or a
wrongful acquittal (false negative)—is more serious, and is a consideration
that involves an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each
outcome and a determination of which is better avoided.108 In this article, we
phrase this question as the “second goal of criminal justice”—error
distribution.
As previously stated, the social norm on this question is the view that
“it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”109
Or, according the English jurist William Blackstone in his 1760s
Commentaries on the Laws of England—“[i]t is better that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer.”110 This adage is perhaps the most
revered in the English criminal law, “exalted by [succeeding generations] of
judges and scholars alike111 as ‘a cardinal principle of Anglo-American
jurisprudence.’”112 Of course, no one insists that the criminal justice system
108

See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 372.
110 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, C OMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 352 (1769).
111 See, e.g., Laura I Appleman, A Tragedy of Errors: Blackstone, Procedural Asymmetry,
and Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 91 (2015) (describing the Blackstone ratio
as the “Mount Everest of legal mantras”).
112 See, Epps, supra note 7, at 1067–68 (citing United States v. Greer, 538 F.2d 437, 441
(D.C. Cir. 1976). But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Eyewitness Identification and the
Problematics of Blackstonian Reform of the Criminal Law, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
181, 220 (2020) (“Blackstone’s ratio is not uncontroversial; it is far from clear that it
accurately captures the costs and benefits of error in the criminal justice system.”).
Blackstone was not the first to invent a maxim on error distribution. Similar maxims were
“in the air” of English legal thought long before Blackstone published his Commentaries.
Epps, supra note 7, at 1080. As Alexander Volokh has amusingly documented in his article
n Guilty Men, many legal and religious thinkers over the centuries have endorsed similar
ratios. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 175–76 (1997). For
example, in 1470, Sir John Fortescue, who served as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench
during the reign of Henry VI, published De Laudibus Legum Angliae (Commendation of
the Laws of England), one paragraph of which stated: “Indeed, one would much rather that
twenty guilty persons should escape the punishment of death, than that one innocent person
should be condemned, and suffer capitally.” JOHN FORTESCUE, COMMENDATION OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 45 (Francis Grigor ed. & trans., Sweet & Maxwell 1917) (c. 1543). As
another example, in a work written in the 1670s but not published until 1736, English jurist
Sir Matthew Hale provided: “it is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished, than
one innocent person should die.” 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 289 (George Wilson ed., 1778) (1736).
The popularity of Blackstone’s version of the maxim and the frequency with which it is
cited are likely due to Blackstone’s enormous influence on the Anglo-American legal
profession more generally. According to Wilfrid Prest, demand for reprinted, abridged, and
translated versions of Blackstone’s written work, the Commentaries on the Laws of
England, was “almost inexhaustible” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Some
commentator described him as “the core element in the British Enlightenment,” comparing
him to Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Voltaire. See WILFRID PREST, WILLIAM BLACKSTONE:
109
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should produce exactly ten false acquittals for every false conviction.113 But
the maxim does convey a value preference in error distribution: wrongful
conviction of the innocent is a much greater wrong than failed conviction of
the guilty. Therefore, “in distributing criminal punishment, we must strongly
err in favor of false negatives . . . in order to minimize false positives.”114
Although Blackstone is cited most often nowadays, the directive to
avoid the erroneous punishment of the innocent has much older roots, “at least
as far back as the Old Testament,” and is beyond the contour of the common
law system.115 For example, in Genesis, Abraham pleads with God to spare
Sodom in order to avoid “slay[ing] the righteous with the wicked . . . .”116 God
agrees that he will not destroy the city if as few as ten righteous persons there
are found.117 Similarly, in Exodus, God commands, “the innocent and
righteous slay thou not. . . .”118 As another example, medieval Continental
judges developed the rule “in dubio pro reo” that means, “in doubt you must
decide for the defendant,”119 which was linked to the notion that judges
LAW AND LETTERS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 307–08 (2008). Across the Atlantic,
within the American academia, practice, as well as within the judiciary, the Commentaries
had a substantial impact as well. According to Albert Miles, with the scarcity of law books
on the frontier, they were “both the only law school and the only law library most American
lawyers used to practice law in America for nearly a century after they were published [in
the 1760s].” See Albert S. Miles, Blackstone and his American Legacy, 5 AUSTL. & N.Z.J.
L. & EDUC. 46, 56 (2000). American subscribers to the first edition of Commentaries, and
later readers who were profoundly influenced by it, include James Iredell, John Marshall,
James Wilson, John Jay, John Adams, James Kent, and Abraham Lincoln, among others.
See generally, Albert Alschuler, Sir William Blackstone and the shaping of American Law,
144 NEW L.J. 896, 897 (1994).
113 Note:
If the ratio were treated as the sole benchmark for the success of the
criminal justice system, it would permit absurd results. For example, a
system that, out of 100 trials, convicted 9 innocent people and
acquitted 91 guilty people (and thus rendered no accurate adjudications
at all) would technically comply with the principle.
Epps, supra note 7, at 1068 n.6 (citing Allen & Laudan, supra note 103, at 75–
77).
114 See Epps, supra

note 7, at 1067-68 (In his article, Epps refers to the general rule of value
preference as the “Blackstone principle,” carefully separating this principle from the
“Blackstone ratio” of 10:1. Epps argues that it is the former and not the latter that “accords
with most people’s deeply felt intuitions about criminal justice.”).
115 See generally, Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 173–74, 177–
78 (1997); Epps, supra note 7, at 1077–81. This paragraph owes a significant debt to
Volokh and Epps whose articles pointed the way to numerous sources.
116 Genesis 18:25.
117 Id. at 18:32.
118 Exodus 23:7.
119 See WHITMAN, supra note 48, at 122–23.
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needed “proof ‘clearer than the midday sun’ before sending a person to blood
punishment.”120
The most common and straightforward argument for the Blackstone
principle is that “the disutility of convicting an innocent person far exceeds
the disutility of finding a guilty person to be not guilty. . . .”121 Justice Harlan,
concurring in Winship, stressed this point:
Because the standard of proof affects the comparative
frequency of [false positives and false negatives], the choice
of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the
comparative social disutility of each. . . . [F]or example, we
view it as no more serious in general for there to be an
erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to
be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff’s favor [in a civil
case]. . . . In a criminal case, on the other hand, we do not
view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is
guilty.”122
Justice Harlan’s argument emphasizes the severity of harm from
wrongful convictions in individual cases: a wrongfully convicted defendant
can lose his liberty or even his life, and also faces the stigma of being officially
branded as a wrongdoer.123 More specifically, Keith Findley has explained
why wrongful convictions at all levels, from petty misdemeanors to capital
murder, are costly and profoundly damaging:
[R]egardless of the sentence imposed, every prosecution and
every conviction is a devastating experience. The stress of
accusation alone is overwhelming. The expense of defense
can be enormous. The loss of one’s good name, of
friendships and family relationships, of employment, of
savings, of the ability to find future employment and
120

Id. at 123.
See Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and Transcendentalism: You Prove It! Why
Should I?, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 701 (1994).
122 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). It is important to
note that typical civil remedies (damages or injunctions) are less severe than criminal
sanctions, meaning that false positives in the civil arena are less costly.
123 See, e.g., Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable
Relationship Between an Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185, 1195 (2010) (“The rationale undergirding the requirement of an
enhanced standard of proof in criminal cases is bottomed on the nature of what is at stake
( i.e., the accused’s liberty or, at times, life) . . . .”).
121
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housing, and the corrosive effects of being marginalized and
disbelieved by one’s own government—all are regular
features of false convictions, regardless of the sentence
imposed. And then consider the enormous losses occasioned
by imprisonment. Beyond those direct punishments, the
collateral consequences of convictions tally literally in the
thousands. . . . A criminal conviction, especially a felony
conviction, marks a person for life, making it enormously
difficult to obtain employment, housing, and education.124
Other arguments have been made from an ideological perspective
that the consequences of convicting an innocent person are more morally
serious than that of acquitting a guilty person. For example, the nineteenthcentury reformist Sir Samuel Romilly observed, “[w]hen, therefore, the guilty
escape, the Law has merely failed. . . . But when the innocent become the
victims of the Law . . . it creates the very evil it was to cure, and destroys the
security it was made to preserve . . . .”125 More recently, Ronald J. Allen and
Larry Laudan suggested, “executing a truly innocent person is . . . a gross
violation of the social contract that promises the government will protect the
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of its citizens.”126 Also, Michael Risinger
has pointed out:
Viewing the state as having more responsibility for harm
done directly to the immediate subjects of its acts than for
the harm done indirectly by its failures to act, or by its
choices to act one way rather than another, has a long
tradition, especially in situations where the latter harm is
done by the subsequent choice of an independent human
agent.127
Standard of proof has been conceived of as one of the most
appropriate tools for distributing errors in criminal cases.128 As Michael L.
DeKay has put it, “[h]igher standards of proof lead to more erroneous

124

Keith A. Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1265, 1293 (2018) (second emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
125 See SIR SAMUEL R OMILLY, Observations on the Criminal Law as It Relates to Capital
Punishments, and on the Mode in Which It Is Administered, in 1 THE SPEECHES OF SIR
SAMUEL ROMILLY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 106, 165–66 (London, James Ridgway and
Sons, 1820).
126 Allen & Laudan, supra note 103, at 66.
127 D. Michael Risinger, Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen
and Laudan, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 991, 1020 (2010) (emphasis added).
128 See, e.g., LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 66–69.
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acquittals and fewer erroneous convictions, all else being equal.” 129 At the
heuristic level, the diagram in Figure 1 demonstrates this important point. 130
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 is a scale representing the likelihood of guilt
that the trier of fact (jurors in a jury trial or a judge in a bench trial) eventually
assigns to the case at trial, which ranges from 0 (the leftmost point), meaning
no likelihood of guilt at all, to 1 (the rightmost point), meaning certainty of
guilt. The vertical axis represents the (total) number of cases that are assigned
with a particular likelihood of guilt by the trier of fact, starting from zero.
Curve I is a representation of all the cases in which a criminal defendant
involved is truly innocent, meaning if the trier of fact knew all the facts to
certainty, the defendant would be found “not guilty.” Curve II is a
representation of all the cases in which a criminal defendant is, conversely,
truly guilty.131
Now, suppose that we draw a vertical line in this diagram to represent
the standard of proof in criminal cases (the “SoP” line). The curves to the left
side of the SoP line represent criminal cases in which a defendant is acquitted,
whether the defendant is truly innocent or truly guilty, since the likelihood of
guilt eventually assigned by the trier of fact in these cases fails to reach the
SoP line. By the same token, the curves to the right side of the SoP line
represent criminal cases in which a defendant is convicted, whether the
defendant is truly innocent or truly guilty, since now the likelihood of guilt
assigned by the trier of fact exceeds the SoP line.

129

Michael L. DeKay, The Difference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and
Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 L. & SOCLAW & SO. INQUIRY 95, 97 (1996).
130 The following portion of this section, including explanations of Figures 1, 2 and 3, owes
a significant debt to Ronald J. Allen and Larry Laudan, whose materials educated both
authors of this article on this matter. See generally Allen, supra note 6; LAUDAN, TRUTH,
ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17.
131 The precise, real shape of Curve I and Curve II is not important for our purpose. In
reality, with regard to either curve, its peak might be higher, its tails shorter, its dispersion
less, or its position along the horizontal axis different from the representation. Figures 1-3
are for demonstrative purposes only.
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Figure 1
Figure 1 thus captures both correct and erroneous fact-findings. With regard
to Curve I, the distribution of cases that criminal defendants deserve to win,
the right tail represents cases in which a criminal defendant is truly innocent,
but the likelihood of guilt eventually assigned by the trier of fact after hearing
all the evidence is unfortunately high. Thus, the fraction of Curve I on the
right side of the SoP line (the area of dark solid lines) represents wrongful
convictions. In contrast, the fraction of Curve I on the left side of the SoP line
(the area of light solid lines) represents correct acquittals since the likelihood
of guilt assigned to those cases is below the SoP line.
Conversely, with regard to Curve II, the distribution of cases for truly
guilty defendants, the left tail represents cases in which the likelihood of guilt
eventually assigned by the trier of fact after hearing all evidence is
unfortunately low. Thus, the fraction of Curve II on the left side of the SoP
line (the area of dark dashed lines) represents wrongful acquittals, while the
fraction of Curve II on the right side of the SoP line (the area of light dashed
lines) is correct convictions.
Overall, the areas hashed with light lines in the diagram represent
correct case fact-findings, including both correct acquittals and correct
convictions, and areas hashed with dark lines represent wrongful case factfindings, including both wrongful acquittals and wrongful convictions.
According to the first goal of the criminal justice system, error reduction, the
light-lined areas in the diagram, correct acquittals, should be much larger than
the dark-lined areas, wrongful convictions, and the larger the better.132 With
132

See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1.
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respect to the second goal of the criminal justice system, error distribution, in
order to follow the Blackstone principle, the area of dark dashed lines,
wrongful acquittals, should be much larger than the area of dark solid lines,
wrongful convictions.133
Now, Figure 1 shows a nearly equal size for the two dark-lined areas,
which means an approximately equal number of wrongful convictions and
wrongful acquittals, obviously not in accordance with the Blackstone
principle.134 If we want to reduce the frequency of wrongful convictions in the
diagram, we can slide the SoP line to the right, that is, toward a higher standard
of proof. All other factors being equal, the farther to the right end of the
diagram that we move the standard of proof, the less likely we will convict
someone who is truly innocent. By doing so, we will also acquit more criminal
defendants who are truly guilty.
When we move the SoP line to the right, to the standard of “beyond
a reasonable doubt” (see Figure 2), the Blackstone principle of heavily
preferring wrongful acquittals to wrongful convictions is satisfied.135
Conversely, all other factors being equal, if we move the SoP line to the left
and a lower standard of proof (see Figure 3), we would convict more guilty
persons but also more innocent persons, which is contrary to the Blackstone
principle.136

133

See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 1; BLACKSTONE,
supra note 2, at 352.
134 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 352.
135 See id.; Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453 (explaining the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
136 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 352.
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Figure 2

Figure 3
Therefore, as the three diagrams show, theoretically, a standard of proof could
be conceived of as a mechanism for distributing errors. And, in theory, the
BARD standard of proof is an essential tool in restraining wrongful
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convictions in criminal cases and achieving the aspiration of the Blackstone
principle.137
III.

DARKNESS OF THE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD

Even though the BARD standard has holy auras surrounding it, that
does not mean it has no weaknesses. Indeed, some of its problems are obvious,
overshadowing its glories. Based on current research,138 we will discuss two
negative aspects of BARD: the confusion surrounding the standard and the
negative byproducts of its application.
A. The confusion surrounding the reasonable doubt standard
As discussed in Section I, the definition of the BARD standard of
proof is still not settled. After the Supreme Court of the United States in
Victor139 rejected the use of the traditional definition of BARD as “moral
certainty” but failed to define what it is, this defect has been more exposed
than ever. Various unofficial definitions of BARD have been developed.140
While most complex notions can be defined in a variety of ways, this
multivalence of BARD presents problems, as Laudan has pointed out:
What we face here are not different glosses on the same
notion but fundamentally different conceptions of the kind
and level of proof necessary to convict someone. To make
matters worse, courts have faulted all these definitions as
either wrong or misleading or unintelligible. Versions that
some courts have found acceptable, even exemplary, have
been dismissed by other courts as violating the constitutional
rights of the accused.141
This situation has prompted many federal and state appellate courts in the
United States “to insist that trial judges should not define BARD for jurors in

137

Id.

138 See, e.g., L AUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW,

supra note 17; Allen & Laudan,
supra note 103; Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295
(2003); Shealy, supra note 11; Federico Picinali, Can the Reasonable Doubt Standard be
Justified? A Reconstructed Dialogue, 31 CAN. J. L. JUR. 365 (2018).
139 See Victor, 511 U.S. at 13–15.
140 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL L AW, supra note 17, at 36–47. This section
owes a significant debt to Larry Laudan, whose book argues that the BARD standard of
proof is indescribable, vague, and lacking in empirical support.
141 Id. at 47.
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their instructions.”142 As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals put it, “[w]e
have repeatedly admonished district courts not to define ‘reasonable
doubt.’”143 A few years later, the same court reiterated that “‘[r]easonable
doubt’ must speak for itself.”144 BARD is seen as “self-defining” and thus not
in need of further commentary.145 Thus, the Seventh Circuit has gone on
record that the idea of reasonable doubt is so transparent that definitions of
BARD—attempts to make “the clear more clear”—can only confuse.146 This
viewpoint is highly representative among courts.147 However, in the eyes of
Laudan and other critics, this argument for avoiding definition is “[t]he
[u]ltimate [a]ct of [d]esperation.”148 As Laudan stated:
[T]his is false on its face. Juries frequently request that
judges explain to them what reasonable doubt is. That would
not occur were it clear and self-evident. More to the point,
we have already seen that different judges and different legal
jurisdictions have profoundly different understandings of
BARD. If judges cannot agree among themselves about this
crucial notion, and it is clear that they cannot, it is a
dangerous act of self-deception (or worse) to suggest that lay
jurors, completely unschooled in the law, will have some
common, shared understanding of this doctrine.149
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Id.
U.S. v. Martin-Tregora, 684 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1982).
144 U.S. v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988).
145 U.S. v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 443 (7th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by
U.S. v. Hollinger 553 F.2d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 1997).
146 Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 at 442.
147 See, e.g., Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define, or Not to Define, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1716, 1719–20 (1990) (“The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have held that jury instructions defining reasonable doubt
are not required and should be avoided. . . . At the state level, the highest courts of Illinois,
Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming have held that jury instructions defining reasonable
doubt are not required. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has even held that any
attempt by a trial judge to define reasonable doubt automatically constitutes reversible
error, and the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibit jury instructions that attempt
to define reasonable doubt.”) (internal citations omitted).
148 See LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 47.
149 Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). Laudan even has direct evidence that jurors are deeply
confused about BARD. He mentions in his book that “in a study of some six hundred
Michigan jurors, Geoffrey Kramer and Doorean Koenig discovered that a quarter believed
that ‘you have a reasonable doubt if you can see any possibility, no matter how slight, that
the defendant is innocent.’ Not surprisingly, roughly the same proportion of jurors (a
quarter) agreed that ‘to find the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must be
100 percent certain of the defendant’s guilt.’” Id. at 49–50 (emphasis in original).
143
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Laudan called this situation “a fundamental confusion at the core of criminal
jurisprudence” and lamented that “the concept of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt—the only accepted, explicit yardstick for reaching a just
verdict in a criminal trial—is obscure, incoherent, and muddled.”150 We are
impressed by Laudan’s courage here. Nonetheless, even though the confusion
surrounding the BARD standard of proof is high, no alternatives have yet
arisen to explain the standard of proof in criminal cases to jurors and judges—
at least none that we have so far found.151 To us, the lack of clarity in the
BARD standard is more of a hard cost than a fixable problem: it serves to
remind us that we live in an imperfect world. As Dean John Henry Wigmore
has observed, “[t]he truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a mode
of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet no
successful method of communicating intelligibly . . . a sound method of selfanalysis for one’s belief.”152
B. Negative byproducts of the reasonable doubt standard
As a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 indicates, all other factors being
equal, a higher standard of proof in criminal trials would lead to fewer
wrongful convictions but more wrongful acquittals.153 While this distribution
satisfies the Blackstone principle,154 wrongful acquittals have their own
serious social costs. One of the earliest critics to raise this concern was Jeremy
Bentham; although he agreed that judges should err in favor of wrongful
acquittals, he nonetheless warned “against those sentimental exaggerations
which tend to give crime impunity, under the pretext of [e]nsuring the safety
of innocence.”155 More recently, Laudan reminded us:
150

Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
Here, in particular, we considered a solution provided by Larry Laudan, using proof by
the “clear and convincing evidence” (CACE) standard in criminal cases, but we had to
reject his suggestion, as most other commentators have, finding that CACE is a much less
attractive option than BARD as the standard of proof in criminal cases. Id. at 64–65. For
reasons to reject the use of CACE as the standard of proof in criminal cases, see e.g., Keith
A. Findley, Reducing Error in the Criminal Justice System, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 1265,
1270 (2018) (“There is indeed nothing intrinsically clearer about ‘clear and convincing’
than there is about ‘reasonable doubt,’ and Professor Laudan points to nothing providing
the clarity he asserts we need.”).
152 WIGMORE, supra note 5 at 325.
153 Figure 2 indicates, in comparison to Figures 1 and 3, when the SoP line slides toward
to the right end of the horizontal axis, the area of dashed lines (acquitted cases),)
inevitably becomes larger.
154 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 352.
155 JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL E VIDENCE 198 (1825). As Bentham saw it:
“Public applause has been, so to speak, set up to auction. At first it was said to be better to
save several guilty men, than to condemn a single innocent man; others, to make the maxim
151
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[The] very occurrence of [wrongful acquittals] shows that
the justice system is failing as a device for finding out the
truth and for ensuring that those who commit crimes pay for
their misdeeds. . . . “We must never forget that . . . the
acquittal of ten guilty persons is exactly ten times as great a
failure of justice as the conviction of one innocent
person.”156
Even those who support the Blackstone principle seem to recognize that it
likely imposes significant costs in terms of a lack of deterrence 157 and possibly
increased recidivism.158 Furthermore, except for those so-called victimless
crimes,159 wrongful acquittals mean that victims who have faced harm, or
even death at the hands of wrongdoers will never receive justice. The physical
harm of the crime is thus followed by psychological (and in some cases also
financial) harm as a result of the criminal justice system in failing to do its
job.160 Repercussions can also ripple out from there, affecting the victim’s

more striking, fixed on the number ten; a third made this ten a hundred, and a fourth made
it a thousand. All these candidates for the prize of humanity have been outstripped by I
know not how many writers, who hold, that, in no case, ought an accused person to be
condemned, unless the evidence amount to mathematical or absolute certainty. According
to this maxim, nobody ought to be punished, lest an innocent man be punished.” Id.
156 LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 70. (quoting
CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 286–87
(1931)) (emphasis added).
157 See Epps, supra note 7, at 1092; see also Rosenthal, supra note 112, at 225 (“Indeed,
the Blackstone ratio itself implies an awareness of a tradeoff – it may not be possible to
minimize the rate of false convictions without unacceptably increasing false acquittals.
Thus, even for Blackstonians, simply minimizing the rate of false convictions will not
do.”).
158 See Charles H. Rose III, Should the Tail Wag the Dog? The Potential Effects of
Recidivism Data on Character Evidence Rules, 36 N.M. L. REV. 341, 344–45 (2006)
(summarizing recidivism rates among various categories of crimes and specific crimes such
as rates as high as 50 percent for property crimes and 7 percent for homicide).
159 For example, drug possession might be a victimless crime. See e.g., Epps, supra note 7,
at 1091 (“The problem is that for many such crimes, the social benefit of individual
convictions is more attenuated and complex than the benefit corresponding to more
paradigmatic crimes involving obvious victims.”).
160
See Eidell Wasserman & Carroll Ann Ellis, Impact of Crime on Victims, in NATIONAL
VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACADEMY TRACK 1: FOUNDATION-LEVEL TRAINING 6–1 (2010),
https://ce4less.com/Tests/Materials/E075Materials.pdf (“The trauma of victimization can
have a profound and devastating impact on crime victims and their loved ones. It can alter
the victim’s view of the world as a just place and leave victims with new and difficult
feelings and reactions that they may not understand.”).
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family members, loved ones, and friends, reducing their faith and confidence
in the criminal justice system.161
Another potential, though less obvious, negative byproduct of the
BARD standard is its likely burden on the goal of error reduction. Because
the BARD standard is designed to achieve a weighted error distribution in
accordance with the Blackstone principle,162 it may actually have a negative
effect on the goal of error reduction. This problem reflects a strict
interpretation of the Blackstone principle, which tells us that “in distributing
criminal punishment, we must strongly err in favor of false negatives (failures
to convict the guilty) in order to minimize false positives (convictions of the
innocent), even if doing so significantly decreases overall accuracy.”163 Even
in our demonstrative diagrams, we can see that when SoP is the reasonable
doubt standard (Figure 2), the total number of wrongful cases of all types
(represented by the dark areas of the diagram) is greater than when SoP is
somewhere lower than the BARD standard (Figure 1). Similarly, the total
number of correct cases (represented by the light areas) is smaller in Figure 2
than in Figure 1. Thus, a quick comparison between Figures 1 and 2 tells us
that when the BARD standard of proof is applied in criminal cases, the overall
accuracy of judicial fact-findings may decline, which contradicts the goal of
error reduction. And yet, theoretically speaking, error reduction is even more
fundamental in jurisprudence than is error distribution, which functions
primarily as a systematic remedy to address the cases that are left out when
we strive for error reduction.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF THE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD IN
PRACTICE: EMPIRICAL MEASUREMENT AND ITS LIMITS

Both those for and against applying the reasonable doubt standard in
criminal cases have sound arguments on their side. More seriously, as multiple
researchers have pointed out, wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals
are two very different types of harm, and proponents and critics of the
Blackstone principle may simply be “talking past each other.”164 When
theoretical understandings are at an impasse, it makes sense to seek out reallife applications and empirical evidence. The legal field is no exception, since
“law is ultimately a profession that shapes the way in which individuals and

Id. (“Crime has significant, yet varying consequences, on individual crime victims, their
families and friends, and communities. The impact of crime on victims results in emotional
and psychological, physical, financial, social and spiritual consequences.”).
162 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 352.
163 See Epps, supra note 7, at 1068 (emphasis added).
164 See id. at 1092; Zalman, supra note 18, at 1325–26.
161
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institutions behave. . . .”165 If possible, any legal rule or theory should be
examined empirically for observable outcomes.166 Such empirical data can
help expose the distance between the law-in-book and the law-in-action,167
facilitating further improvement of the rule. For a concept like the BARD
standard—whose very existence and definition are both mysterious and
controversial—empirical data is even more valuable. The empirical question
we would like to ask is what is the effect of the BARD standard in judicial
practice? Unfortunately, very few extant empirical studies would allow us to
analyze how well the BARD standard functions in real cases. The rest of this
section attempts to develop such a study to fill the void.
A. Thinking Empirically: The Problem of Empirical Study on the
Reasonable Doubt Standard
In an ideal criminal justice system, no error of any kind would
happen: no criminal could escape the punishment of law, no innocent person
would ever be convicted, and the total number of convictions would equal the
total number of crimes. However, such a perfect state is impossible in practice.
Litigation involves human decision-making, in which errors (both false
positives and false negatives) are inevitable.168 In the pre-trial context, law
enforcement and the legal system both face budgetary restraints, which lead
to certain crimes and charges being prioritized while others are deemed “de
minimis” and not charged.169 Errors may also happen at trial; these generally

165

See Zalman, supra note 18, at 1326.
See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Development of Utility Theory. II., 58 J. POL. ECON.
373, 395 (1950) (“This third criterion of congruence with reality should have been
sharpened, sharpened into the insistence that theories be examined for their implications
for observable behavior, and these specific implications compared with observable
behavior. The implication of the diminishing marginal utility of money, that people will
not gamble, should have been used to test this assumption, not to reproach the individuals
whose behavior the theory sought to describe.”).
167 See generally Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12
(1910).
168 Karl Mason, Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Sep. 16, 2014),
https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/archives/blogs-2014/2014-bloglearningfromerror.htm.
169 See Ioannis Lianos, et al., An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for
Infringements of Competition Law: A Comparative Analysis, CTR. FOR L., ECON. & SOC’Y
UCL
FAC.
OF
LAWS
149
(May
2014),
https://www.fne.gob.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Estudio.pdf.
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involve wrongful convictions, wrongful acquittals, procedural errors, or
evidentiary errors.170 Finally, most post-trial errors occur in sentencing.171
For our purposes, we focus on epistemological errors in the verdict
of a criminal trial. If the trial verdict is in accordance with the truth, then it is
epistemologically correct (either a correct conviction or a correct acquittal); if
the trial verdict is contradictory with the truth, then it is epistemologically
erroneous (either a wrongful conviction or a wrongful acquittal). Ideally, an
empirical study on the impact of the BARD standard on a criminal justice
system—in terms of its effectiveness on the goal of error distribution and its
burden on the goal of error reduction—would make use of a complete set of
empirical data on wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals in a
designated criminal justice system where the BARD standard is implemented.
This data would allow us to check: (a) whether the actual ratio of wrongful
acquittals and wrongful convictions is in accordance with the Blackstone
principle;172 and (b) whether the total number of wrongful acquittals and
wrongful convictions overburdens the criminal justice system.
However, in reality, no one has such comprehensive data. Both
wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals are unknown data for the most
part; occasionally, wrongful convictions have been exposed through various
channels, like through the advancement of forensic technologies such as DNA
typing, reminding us that wrongful convictions indeed happen in criminal
cases.173 Wrongful acquittals are even less visible, even though we sense that
their frequency of occurrence (more likely than not) would be even higher
than that of wrongful convictions. This deadly dilemma of the lack of data on

See Fritz Allhoff, Wrongful Convictions, Wrongful Acquittals, and Blackstone’s Ratio,
43 Australasian J. of Legal Phil. 39, 39 (stating that “criminal law can err in either of two
ways: it can wrongly convict the innocent, or it can wrongly acquit the guilty.”);
Wrongful Convictions, NATIONAL I NSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/justicesystem-reform/wrongful-convictions (last visited Sep. 30, 2021) (explaining that “ [a]
conviction may be classified as wrongful [if] . . . [t]here were procedural errors that
violated the convicted person’s rights.”); Evidentiary Errors, NORTH CAROLINA CENTER
ON ACTUAL INNOCENCE, https://www.nccai.org/causes/evidence-error (last visited Sep.
30, 2021) (arguing that “[i]mproper collection, labeling, or preservation of evidence, or
the less than complete processing of a crime scene, can be the first steps in the road to
conviction for an innocent person. Once the evidence reaches the lab, errors can
multiply.”).
171 See Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the
Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 108 GEO. L.J. 287, 289 (2019) (stating that
“[i]nmates are sitting in federal prisons serving unlawful sentences. Many will die in
those prisons serving ‘unjust’ sentences.”).
172 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 352.
173 See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL iii (1996).
170
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both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals indeed deserves further
discussion.
i.

Data on wrongful convictions

Wrongful convictions are at best partially observable. Rarely and
randomly, some wrongful convictions have been belatedly exposed by DNA
evidence and/or confessions from the real perpetrators,174 but the data on such
cases are scarce, or in Chinese “可遇而不可求” (something that we cannot
ask for). Data collectors may thus have to rely on societal efforts to expose
wrongful convictions. In recent years, an increasing number of privately
funded projects and pro bono clinics have aimed to exonerate the wrongfully
convicted and prevent future injustice.175 Such projects often attract media
attention (every story of redemption is encouraging) in addition to providing
belated justice to the wrongfully convicted, their families, and to society as a
whole. The National Registry of Exonerations—a project collectively led by
the University of California Irvine Newkirk Center for Science and Society,
University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan State University College
of Law—has collected and publicized information about all known
exonerations of innocent criminal defendants in the United States since
1989.176 As of October 2021, according to the U.S. National Registry of
Exonerations, there have been 2,872 exonerations since the project’s
inception, and those wrongfully convicted have collectively lost more than
25,600 years to prison.177
While those numbers are significant, they hardly represent all
wrongful convictions. Exoneration projects are restrained by budgetary
174

See, e.g., Thomas McGowan, Freeing the innocent and identifying true perpetrators,
INNOCENT PROJECT BLOG (Aug. 1, 2008), https://innocenceproject.org/freeing-theinnocent-and-identifying-true-perpetrators (quoting a former exoneree after he served 23
years for a rape he did not commit as saying, “I never saw Kenneth Wayne Woodson [the
actual perpetrator]; I don’t know if he ever saw me. He went to prison a year later than I
did. I’m glad he confessed, but I think the only reason he did is because of the DNA hit.”).
175 Many exoneration projects have been developed through the growth in forensic
technology. For example, DNA technology inspired the development of the Innocence
Project, which has helped 375 DNA exonerees to date, of which twenty-one had been
serving time on death row, and forty-four had pled guilty to crimes they did not commit.
Furthermore, the exonerated had served an astonishing fourteen years on average at the
time of their exoneration. See DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
https://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states (last visited Sep.
30, 2021).
176
About
The
Registry,
The
National
Registry
of
Exonerations,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 30,
2021).
177 Id.
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concerns (of both financial and human capital) and thus may have to focus
primarily on high-profile cases, such as murder or rape, not low-profile cases,
whether felony or misdemeanor, that are mainly handled by local attorneys
and are “passively or actively concealed from public attention.”178 In addition,
while groundbreaking forensic technology has also contributed to the fight
against wrongful convictions, it is also not a panacea in this situation; DNA
typing, for example, is still circumstantial evidence, which cannot not directly
tell us who did what wrong things.179 As such, from an epistemological point
of view, wrongful conviction data are at best partially observable.
ii.

Data on wrongful acquittals

Just as with wrongful convictions, wrongful acquittals can be
revealed through ex-post self-reporting by the wrongdoers, individuals who
have “luckily” avoided punishment in the criminal justice system.180
However, not surprisingly, there exists little incentive for such confessions;
likewise, minimal incentive exists for social efforts to uncover wrongful
acquittals because such individuals are constitutionally protected against
double jeopardy and res judicata.181 Therefore, reliable data sources of
wrongful acquittals are almost nonexistent.
Perhaps largely due to such severe shortage of data on wrongful
convictions and acquittals, little meaningful work has been done in terms of
empirical studies in this field.182 How, then, do we get around the problem of
insufficient sample data?

178

Exonerations in the United States, 1989–2012, National Registry of Exonerations
(May 20, 2012),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012
_summary.pdf.
179 Kevin Keller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV.
241, 241 (2006) (“Empirical research indicates that jurors routinely undervalue
circumstantial evidence (DNA, fingerprints, and the like) and overvalue direct evidence
(eyewitness identifications and confessions) when making verdict choices, even though
false-conviction statistics indicate that the former is normally more probative and more
reliable than the latter.”) (emphasis added).
180 See e.g., O.J. SIMPSON ET AL., IF I DID IT: CONFESSIONS OF THE KILLER XLV (2007).
181 See U.S. C ONST. AMEND. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see also The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar
to Reintroducing Evidence, 89 Yale L.J. 962, 962 (1980).
182 See, e.g., LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 17, at 8 (“In writing
this book, I have been constantly frustrated by the paucity of empirical information that
would allow us to reach clear conclusions about how well or badly our legal methods are
working. Where there are reliable empirical studies with a bearing on the issues addressed
here, I will make use of them. Unfortunately, given the dearth of hard evidence, the analysis
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B. An alternative empirical model for testing the effect of the
reasonable doubt standard on restraining wrongful convictions
Because the ideal model of empirical study on BARD is not possible
due to the insufficiency of the sample data (particularly on wrongful
acquittals), we developed an alternative approach to approximate the effect of
the reasonable doubt standard in restraining wrongful convictions in a
criminal justice system.
The harsh reality is that an empirical study on the impact of the
BARD standard on total error reduction (the first goal of criminal justice) and
error distribution (the second goal of criminal justice) cannot be meaningfully
done since it would need data on wrongful acquittals. To account for this, we
narrowed our scope of analysis to the effect of the BARD standard on
restraining wrongful convictions, the standard’s most important function as
designed. Even then, we had to continue adjusting from the ideal empirical
model because of the limited availability of direct data (confessions and
exonerations) on wrongful convictions. Thus, we decided to focus on
statistically available but indirect data, choosing three indicators that could
approximate changes in wrongful convictions in a criminal justice system
(collectively, “Indicators”):
i.

Indicator 1: The percentage of criminal cases that are awarded
with the verdict of not guilty (“acquittal rate”)

ii.

Indicator 2: Appellate courts’ reversals on criminal trial
judgments based on a failure to satisfy the BARD standard
(“reversals”)

iii.

Indicator 3: Non-prosecution rate

We hypothesize that: (a) more acquittals hint at less wrongful
convictions, and vice versa; (b) more reversals hint at less wrongful
convictions, and vice versa; and (c) a higher rate of non-prosecution hints at
less wrongful convictions, and vice versa. These suppositions are based in
common sense: when the total number of pending criminal cases is fixed, the
presence of more acquittals, reversals, and non-prosecutions would mean that
fewer cases will receive a verdict of guilty, thus leaving less chance for
wrongful convictions to occur.183
in this book will fall back on armchair hunches about the likely effects of various rules and
procedures far more often than I would have liked.”).
183 This adjusted empirical study is aimed to show whether changing the formal standard
of proof changes outcomes. What it does not tell us is whether those outcomes are correct
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While collective data of these three Indicators should not be difficult
to gather in a criminal justice system with open data access for the public, it
is still difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the impact of the BARD standard
from that of other factors including the presumption of innocence, burden of
proof, and other defendant friendly rules. All these factors are embedded in a
criminal proceeding, protecting the constitutional rights of the accused and
preventing wrongful convictions.184 We need more information than just the
three Indicators to ascertain the impact of the BARD standard on restraining
wrongful convictions.
To implement our study, we needed to satisfy two more conditions.
First and foremost, we needed a clear benchmark date on which the BARD
standard of proof was added to (or excluded from) a criminal justice system.
This date would allow us to collect data for two comparable periods of time;
the empirically observable periods of time that immediately preceded and
followed the benchmark. By comparing collected data of the three Indicators
during these periods, we can approximate the impact of the BARD standard
on the designated criminal justice system. The second necessary condition is
that all other factors in the designated criminal justice system should remain
in the same or at least similar condition throughout the entire period of
observation. Only if all other variables stayed relatively stable could we
attribute the observed variations in the Indicators to the impact of the BARD
standard.
Still, even if these two conditions are met, correlation does not by
itself imply causation;185 and the collected data of the three Indicators are not
direct evidence of wrongful convictions. That is why we emphasize here that
this empirical study can only approximate the effectiveness of BARD in
restraining wrongful convictions.
These necessary conditions for such a study severely limit its
likelihood of being implemented. Because no country would allow such an
experiment with its criminal justice system, we must turn to countries with
pertinent, extant data. And yet, as discussed in the beginning of this article,
the BARD standard originated in common law countries centuries ago and
or incorrect. For example, more acquittals could also possibly mean more wrongful
acquittals. However, that is not the subject of our study. Here, we focus on more acquittals
meaning less convictions (supposing that the total number of criminals trials in the scope
of study is fixed), thus less opportunities for having wrongful convictions.
184 See e.g., Model Charge: Burden of Proof Presumption of Innocence, Reasonable
Doubt, NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.courts.nh.gov/model-chargeburden-proof-presumption-innocence-reasonable-doubt (last visited Sep. 30, 2021)
(stating that “[u]nder our constitutions, all defendants in criminal cases are presumed to
be innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proving guilt is
entirely on the State. The defendant does not have to prove his innocence.”).
185 See, e.g., Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Economics, History, and Causation, 85
BUS. HIST. REV. 39, 61 (2011).
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lacks a clear benchmark date.186 Thus, such a study has to be done in a country
in which criminal proceedings have recently been changed with regard to the
BARD standard, in which sufficient and available data on the three Indicators
exist for the periods of time surrounding the benchmark event, in which the
legal system has otherwise been largely unchanged throughout the period of
observation. Such a list of countries is short, indeed, but such a case does exist.
V.

A CASE STUDY ON CHINA

We turn to China, whose criminal procedural law underwent a
significant change in 2013, making possible a rare research opportunity for an
empirical study on the BARD standard. In that year, China, for the first time,
introduced and implemented the reasonable doubt standard in its criminal
proceedings through an amendment to its Criminal Procedure Law that took
effect as of January 1, 2013.187 Together with China’s free access to
nationwide judicial data and the otherwise relatively unchanged status of the
Chinese criminal justice system at this time, this development presents an
unique opportunity to observe and evaluate the effect of the BARD standard
on restraining wrongful convictions in the nation.188
We begin this section by introducing the unique judicial data set
available in China and explaining why it enables us to run an empirical study
as laid out in Part IV.189 We also delve into definitions of a host of quantitative
measures that will recur throughout the remainder of this article. We then
apply and analyze the collected Chinese judicial data through the three

186

See infra Introduction and Part I-A.
Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法)
[Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1970, rev’d Mar. 17, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013),
art. 53 (China), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2012-03/17/content_2094354.htm.
188See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingshi
Susong Fa” De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》的解释
) [The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning the Implementation of the
Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Jud. Comm.
Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 5, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013), art. 105 (China),
https://www.spp.gov.cn/sscx/201502/t20150217_91462.shtml;
Zhonghua
Renmin
Gonghe Guo Zhuxi Ling: Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Xiugai “Zhonghua
Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingshi Susong Fa” De Jueding” (中华人民共和国主席令：全国
人民代表大会关于修改《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》的决定) [The order of the
President of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China,
announcement regarding the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s
Republic
of
China],
(March
14,
2012),
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/201203/15/content_2092191.htm.
189 See supra Part IV.
187
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Indicators defined in Part IV,190 and we conclude this section by presenting
our findings and the limitations of the study. Ultimately, in this Chinese case,
the BARD standard appears to be more of a dogmatic tool than a pragmatic
method to be used in the prevention of wrongful convictions.
A.

The unique opportunity of China as a test case

China presents a unique opportunity to study the effectiveness of the
BARD standard on restraining wrongful convictions for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, to the best of our knowledge, China is the only country to
have launched the BARD standard into its criminal justice system in the
twenty-first century.191 The reasonable doubt standard was first introduced in
the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China in 2012, made
effective as of January 1, 2013, as an answer to the political and public outcry
that followed the exposure of several wrongful convictions in the first decade
of the century.192 The BARD standard was added to Article 53 as a new
subclause to supplement the original standard of proof, which had required
evidence to be “reliable and sufficient” (证据确实充分标准) for fact-finders
to reach a guilty verdict of any criminal case.193 This particular legislative
moment offers the benchmark (January 1, 2013) that we needed to activate an
empirical study on the effect of BARD.194 Besides offering the necessary
190

Id.
Japan introduced BARD into its criminal justice system with a traceable record, doing
so
in
1945.
See
Reforms
in Japanese Criminal Procedure under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. 401, 412
(1949).
192 See Wang Minyuan (王敏远) et al., Bitan: Cuoan, Sixing Yu Fazhi (笔谈:错案、死刑
与法治) [Discussions: Erroneous Cases, Death Penalty and Rule of Law], 3 (中外法学)
[PEKING UNIV. L.J.] 565, 582 (2015); see generally Chen Yongsheng, A Perspective of
China's Criminal Misjudgment: An Analysis of Twenty Wrongful Convictions That
Shocked The Whole Country As A Sample, 3 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 45 (2007); Chen
Yongsheng (陈永生), Woguo Xingshi Wupan Wenti Toushi: Yi 20 Qi Zhenjing Quanguo
De Xingshi Yuanan Wei Yangben De Fenxi (我国刑事误判问题透视——以20起震惊全
国的刑事冤案为样本的分析) [A Perspective of China's Criminal Misjudgment: An
Analysis of Twenty Wrongful Convictions That Shocked The Whole Country As A
Sample], 6 Zhengfa Luntan (政法论坛) [TRIBUNE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW] 3
(2011).
193 See Wei Hanqing, The Integration and Practice of “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” in an
Inquisitorial Legal System—Taking China as an Example, 68 STOCKHOLM UNIV.
RESEARCH PAPER 1, 2 (2019).
194 Here, we chose January 1, 2013, the effective date of the BARD standard in China, as
the benchmark for the empirical study, including for Indicator 2 (appellate reversal rates).
We understand, however, that the time delay between conviction and appeal means that
cases that resulted in conviction under the old SoP would still wind their way through the
191
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benchmark date, this legislative moment allows a clear comparison of data on
the three Indicators (annual acquittal rate, number of criminal cases reversed,
and non-prosecution rate) in a defined period of time before and after the
benchmark, which in turn allows us to extrapolate the impact of BARD.
Collectively speaking, such a scenario offers unparalleled empirical insight
into the effectiveness of BARD on restraining wrongful convictions.
Furthermore, this case study fulfills the necessary condition of
constancy (ceteris paribus) in that throughout the designated period of
observation, other than the introduction of the BARD standard, China’s
criminal justice system was largely unchanged. An indicator of such
systematic stability is that before the 2012 Amendments were promulgated,
the Criminal Procedure Law of China was most recently amended in the year
1996.195 The major change to the Chinese criminal justice system subsequent
to the 2012 Amendments emerged in November 2018, when the Criminal
Procedure Law of China was amended to add a host of new concepts into the
Chinese criminal justice system, including a whole new mechanism of plea
bargaining (with Chinese characteristics) that would supposedly directly
affect the outcome of many criminal cases in China.196 Because such a major
change to Chinese criminal procedure would commingle with our study target
and dilute analytic results,197 we chose to use this date as the cutoff for our
observation period. Our study covers a range of twelve years centered around
the benchmark date of January 1, 2013, when the BARD standard was
implemented: six years after this date (2013–18), to the time when the
Criminal Procedure Law of China was amended; and six years before this
date (2007–12). The six preceding years may be considered as an immediately
relevant period that led into the promulgation of BARD, and the six following
appellate courts long after the formal change to the BARD standard. Nonetheless, we
cannot determine what other specific timing would be a better changepoint for this study.
Thus, using January 1, 2013, as the benchmark is a compromised choice made for this
study.
195 Before the 1996 Amendments were promulgated, the Criminal Procedure Law of China,
enacted in 1979, was never amended. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingshi Susong
Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, rev’d
Mar. 17, 1996) (China).
196 See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingshi Susong Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法
) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, rev’d Oct. 26, 2018) (China); Han Xu
(韩旭), 2018 Nian Xingsu Fa Zhong Renzui Renfa Congkuan Zhidu (2018年刑诉法中认
罪认罚从宽制度) [The Leniency System of Pleading Guilty and Accepting Penalty in the
2018 Amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law of China], 1 Fazhi Yanjiu (法治研究)
[Research on Rule of Law] 35–45 (2019).
197 See Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196.
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years may be considered as the period that would reflect the greatest impact
of the BARD standard on the Chinese criminal justice system.198
In addition, this study has been made possible by China’s movement
to judicial transparency and digitalization in recent years. Before 2012, most
Chinese court files, especially important ones like judgments, were only
available in hard copy and were largely inaccessible to the public.199 In July
2013, the Supreme People’s Court of China launched China Judgments
Online (中国裁判文书网) (CJO), a database and search engine for court files
nationwide, with open and free access to the public.200 According to the
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Issuance of Judgments on
the Internet by the People’s Courts, promulgated in November 2013, all levels
of courts in China are required to upload and publish judgments on CJO within
seven days after the date on which they come into effect and become
binding.201 Today, CJO holds more than 100 million case files, including more
than nine million criminal judgments, and has collected judicial data from as
far back as 1996.202
The clear introduction of the reasonable doubt standard, a
determinable study period during which the nation’s criminal justice system
was stable, and the open access to judicial data in China enables a unique case
198

Admittedly, it is too optimistic to hope that the twelve-year period of the study would
offer a truly ceteris paribus analytic environment, especially given how fast China has been
developing since the launch of the “Reform and Opening Up” (改革开放) national policy
in 1978. To take into account the most statistically observable socioeconomic measures
(the gross domestic product and changes in the overall crime rate), we further conducted a
regression analysis (an analytic method of econometrics) on the data of Indicator 1 (i.e.,
acquittal rate) to filter out the impact of such variables on this Indicator. We also did a
simple regression test on the data of Indicator 3. In both cases, these tests allowed us to
extrapolate a less biased estimate of the effectiveness of the BARD standard on the data.
In contrast, our study for Indicator 2 (i.e., reversals) did not warrant a regression analysis
to consider other social economic factors, partially due to data limitation. See infra Part VD.
199 See QI QI (齐奇), RULE OF LAW IN CHINA AND JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY (法治中国与
司法公开) (2014).
200

See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE (中国裁判文书网), http://wenshu.court.gov.cn (last
visited Oct. 4, 2021); Judicial Transparency of Chinese Courts, art. 3., THE SUPREME
PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (July 20, 2015),
http://english.court.gov.cn/2015-07/20/content_21332354.htm.
201 See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Zai Hulian Wang Gongbu Caipan
Wenshu De Guiding (最高人民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定)
[The Supreme People’s Court’s Rules on Publishing Judicial Opinions on the Internet],
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-5867.html.
202 See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE, supra note 200 (showing real-time updated data shown
on the front page) (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
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study to evaluate the effectiveness of the BARD standard in restraining
wrongful convictions.
B.

The Chinese judicial data under study

For nationwide data on acquittals (Indicator 1) and non-prosecutions
(Indicator 3) in China between 2007 and 2018, we relied on statistics
disclosed in the Annual Working Reports of the Supreme People’s Court and
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, respectively.203 These official reports
from the two highest judicial authorities in China204 provide a good overview
of the operations of the Chinese criminal justice system, with national data on
various aspects of judicial practice from the local to the central level,
including national data on the annual acquittal rate and the non-prosecution
rate.205 The Annual Working Reports are presented by the chief justice and the
chief procurator each year at the annual meeting of the P.R.C. National
People’s Congress, which then has to review and approve the reports before
they become accessible to the general public.206
See The Annual Working Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (最高人民检
察院工作报告) See SUPREME PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gzbg/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2021); The
Annual Working Report of the Supreme People’s Court (最高人民法院工作报告),
SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT
OF
THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
204 See Zhuhao Wang & David Caruso, Is an Oral-Evidence Based Criminal Trial Possible
in China?, 21 INT’ L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 52, 57–58 (2018) (explaining that in China, the
concept of the judicial branch of government is more expansive than its counterpart in the
United States and many other countries. At the highest level, it includes the Ministry of
Public Security, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the
Ministry of Justice. To the contrary, in the United States, for example, the judicial branch
of government is made up of the court system only).
205 As of the time of this study, we only have access to aggregate macro-level data. As case
specific data points become more available in the future, we are hopeful that our analysis
remains relevant.
206 See, e.g., Lianggao Baogao Zancheng Lv Chuang Shinian Xingao, Ciqian Jiunian
203

Congwei Chaoguo 85% (两高报告赞成率创十年新高，此前九年从未超过85%) [The
Approval Rate of Both the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate Hits a Ten-Year High, which Has Never Exceeded 85% in the Previous Nine
Years], Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (中国青年报) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY] (March 16, 2015),
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/03-16/7130454.shtml; Lianggao Baogao Tongguo,
Zuigao Fa Fandui Piao Zengduo Zuigao Jian Depiao Lv Fanchao (“两高”报告通过，最
高法反对票增多最高检得票率反超) [The Annual Working Report of Both the Supreme
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Passed, with “No” Votes Against
the SPC Increased While “Yes” Votes for the SPP Exceeded the Other], Caixin Wang (财
新网) [CAIXIN] (March 15, 2019), http://topics.caixin.com/2019-03-15/101392678.html.
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Nationwide data on reversals of criminal cases (Indicator 2) in China
between 2007 and 2018 are not included in the Annual Working Reports of
the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and so
we turned to other data sources. The next best available alternative, to our
knowledge, is CJO, which collects court files of reversed criminal cases. In
addition to CJO, several other popular Chinese online judicial databases exist,
including Gather Law Cases Online (聚法),207 OpenLaw Judgments
Search,208 Legal Information Center of Peking University (北大法宝),209 and
WuSong Tech (无讼)210. While each database is different, the judicial
documents and other materials in these databases largely overlap with the ones
in CJO.
Despite the additional features offered by other databases, we chose
to use CJO to research and collect data for Indicator 2 for three primary
reasons. First, as mentioned above, CJO is the only judicial database launched
and maintained by the Supreme People’s Court,211 thus it is the most
authoritative one. Second, while some other databases do occasionally report
marginally more cases than CJO from recent years, they all lack substantial
amounts of data from the era before 2013.212 In contrast, CJO has collected
case materials as early as 1996 and holds the largest number of criminal
judgments and related searchable materials from the era before 2013.213 Thus,

The two judicial authorities even have an internal “competition” for the quality and rate of
satisfaction of their Annual Working Reports. All representatives of the National People’s
Congress of China vote Yes, No, or Abstention at the annual meeting on the question of
approving the two reports. Each year, the Chinese media are keen to report on which of the
two Annual Working Reports received a higher number of Yes votes from the National
People’s Congress. For example, in 2015, the Supreme People’s Court won with 2,619 Yes
votes, beating the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, which had 2,529 Yes votes. In 2019,
the Supreme People’s Procuratorate won with 2,843 Yes votes versus the other’s 2,725 Yes
votes.
207 GATHER LAW CASES ONLINE (聚法), https://www.jufaanli.com (last visited Oct. 4,
2021).
208 OPENLAW JUDGMENTS SEARCH, https://openlaw.cn (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
209 LEGAL INFORMATION CENTER OF PEKING U NIVERSITY (北大法宝),
http://www.pkulaw.cn (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
210 WUSONG TECH (无讼), https://www.itslaw.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
211 See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE, supra note 200.
212 See generally Yingmao Tang (唐应茂), Judicial Disclosure and Its Determinants: Data
Analysis Based on China Judgment Online (司法公开及其决定因素:基于中国裁判文书
网的数据分析), CHINESE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES, SHANGHAI JIAO TONG
UNIVERSITY (Mar. 26, 2021).
213 See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE, supra note 200. As we will address later, CJO still lacks
much data for the period between 2007 and 2013, although its records are more complete
than any other online judicial database of China.
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CJO has the most complete data for criminal cases between 2007 and 2018,
the observation period of our study. In addition, CJO allows users to search
any arrangement of keywords in any specific portion(s) of a case judgment,
an advanced function not provided by competing databases, rather than simply
running a full-text search for keyword (e.g., searching “BARD and/or
standard of proof and/or reliable and sufficient evidence” in the portion of a
judge’s reasoning, and searching “reverse and remand” in the judgment
portion).214 Such strong search functions allowed us to track targeted usage of
BARD-related keywords including “standard of proof” (证明标准), “beyond
a reasonable doubt” (排除合理怀疑), “reasonable doubt” (合理怀疑), “no
punishment in doubtful cases” (疑罪从无) (a traditional Chinese phrase with
the same meaning as BARD), and “reliable and sufficient evidence” (证据确
实充分) (the traditional Chinese standard of proof in criminal cases). We
targeted these searches to the relevant portion(s) of appellate court decisions
for reversal (e.g., the appellate judges’ reasoning), while ignoring irrelevant
portion(s) of the same documents (e.g., the summary of both parties’
arguments). This allowed us to affirm whether such keywords played a
substantial role in a given appellate court’s reversal decision.215

C.

The roadmap: Recap of the three Indicators in the context of
China

Theoretically speaking, as applied anywhere in the world, once
“beyond a reasonable doubt” is made an official standard of proof in criminal
trials, it would be expected to affect every stage of a criminal proceeding—
ranging from the pre-trial evidentiary hearing all the way through the appellate
courts, where a case may be overturned due to failure of the BARD standard.
Since direct data on wrongful acquittals is unobservable and direct data on
wrongful convictions is, at best, partially observable, we attempted here to use
the three Indicators as proxies, to approximate the effectiveness of the BARD
standard in the reduction of wrongful convictions in Chinese criminal
proceedings based on three hypotheses.

214

Id.
An appellate court judge may reverse a criminal trial judgment on various grounds. For
our purposes, we focused the data collection for Indicator 2 on those reversals that were
based on the standard of proof in criminal cases not being satisfied.
215
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Indicator 1: Acquittal rate

The first hypothesis is if the reasonable doubt standard is effective,
it will safeguard the accused in those cases in which evidence is weak and
would not support surviving the BARD standard. Such cases would be
expected to end up with acquittals. If this hypothesis is valid, we would expect
the national acquittal rate in Chinese criminal cases to increase in the years
after January 1, 2013, as compared to the immediately preceding period. To
test Indicator 1, we first observed changes in the national annual acquittal rate
as published in the Annual Working Reports of the People’s Supreme Court
for the period between 2007 and 2018.216 However, correlation may not
suggest causation; to further distill the effectiveness of BARD, we then
performed a multifactor linear regression analysis217 to test the effect of
BARD on changes in the annual acquittal rate by taking into account two
major and quantifiable socioeconomic factors, namely the gross domestic
product and the overall crime rate in China. If the introduction of these two
variables caused the coefficient on the fixed effect of BARD to be statistically
insignificant, then the result would suggest that other social economic factors
play a bigger role than the BARD standard in changes in the annual acquittal
rate in China.218

The Annual Working Report of the Supreme People’s Court, supra note 203.
A multifactor regression is a statistical model that describes the relationship between
one dependent variable and multiple independent variables, whereas a dependent variable
can be viewed as the “outcome” variable and the independent variable can be viewed as
the “control” that can be manipulated or changed to have a direct effect on the dependent
variable. Regression analysis can be used to analyze the causal relation for the impact of
the independent variable(s) on the dependent variable(s). In other words, a regression
model may be used to predict the change in the dependent variable, given the changes in
the independent variable. As used in this article, the dependent variables will be the
Indicators (the proxies for changes in wrongful convictions), and the independent variables
will be the introduction of BARD standard, and other changes in socioeconomic conditions
that we will discuss below. In short, for simplicity and due to data constraints, we will rely
on multiple linear regression models in this article to explain and model the linear
relationship between the introduction of BARD and the Indicators, and assess whether the
observed relations are statistically significant. See JEFFREY WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY
ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 68–77 (2006) (providing a detailed discussion on
regression analysis).
218 As an integral concept in hypothesis testing, statistical significance is a mathematical
way to prove that a certain statistic is reliable. In this study, such statistics would be the
relationship between the introduction of BARD and the various Indicators. Statistical
significance builds on the presumption of normal distribution and reflects risk tolerance
and confidence level. See id. at 121–35.
216
217
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Indicator 2.1: Number of criminal cases that were reversed
and remanded

A wrongfully convicted case may be rectified in subsequent appellate
proceedings, and judgments of criminal cases issued after 2013 in China may
be appealed on the grounds of failing the reasonable doubt standard of
proof.219 If the BARD standard is working effectively as the legislature
intended, our second hypothesis is that we would expect the number and rate
of criminal cases that are reversed and remanded (RR) for the reason of
failing the standard of proof (SoP) to have increased after 2013, as compared
to the immediately preceding period. To evaluate this hypothesis, we first
examined all criminal cases that were reversed and remanded with reasons
attributable to a failed standard of proof between 2007 and 2018.220 Then,
among all such RR cases, we examined the number of cases that failed the
traditional Chinese standard of proof (“reliable and sufficient evidence” (RS))
and, for cases decided after 2013, the number of cases that failed the BARD
standard. If in the post-2013 period, the frequency of BARD being mentioned
in RR criminal cases in China is higher than the frequency of RS being
mentioned, and if there is an upward trend for a failed SoP as the general
reason for RR criminal cases in China in the post-2013 period, then that would
suggest that the BARD standard is an effective tool utilized by the Chinese
appellate courts to scrutinize criminal trial judgments and grant reversal and
remand. Otherwise, depending on further analysis, we could infer that the
BARD standard did not add much value to the original criminal standard of
proof in China.
iii.

Indicator 2.2: Number of cases that were reversed and
acquitted in China’s “second instance trial”

Similar to Indicator 2.1 and the hypothesis thereof, we examined how
the BARD standard helps reduce wrongful convictions at the appellate level
through appellate decisions of “reversal and acquittal,” a unique feature in
Chinese court settings.221 While a civil or criminal appellate court in the
219

See Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196, art.

53.
220

Trial court judgment of a given case (civil or criminal) may be reversed and remanded
for reasons other than a failure of the standard of proof. Such RR cases are irrelevant to our
study and thus not in the scope of our analysis.
221 Unlike any common law system, in which trials are particularly reliant on the testimony
and cross-examination of witnesses to furnish to the judge and/or jury the relevant facts of
the case, “the appearance rate of witnesses to orally testify at criminal trials in China is and
has been extremely low. In keeping with common and civil law pre-trial preparation, it is
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United States and other common law countries fully delegates the job of factfinding to the trial court—and thus only grants a reversal and remand if it
wants to reverse a trial court judgment—a Chinese civil or criminal appellate
court ( 二审法院, the second instance trial court) has the authority to review
both fact and law, and can reverse and directly acquit (RA) the accused if so
justified,222 like in a case with a failed SoP. Thus, while an appellate court in
China may reverse and remand a criminal conviction to the lower court on the
grounds that the evidence collectively provided by the procurator fails the
BARD standard, the appellate court can also reverse and directly acquit the
convicted for the same reason.223
If the BARD standard is working effectively, our third hypothesis is
that we would expect that the number of criminal cases that are reversed and
acquitted at the appellate level for the reason of failing the SoP to increase
after 2013, as compared to the immediately preceding period. To test this
hypothesis, we ran an examination similar to what we did for Indicator 2.1,224
but for RA cases rather than RR cases. If in the post-2013 period, the
frequency of BARD being mentioned in RA cases in China is higher than the
frequency of RS being mentioned, and if there is an increase in the number of
RA cases in China in this period as compared to the preceding one, then that
again would strongly suggest that the BARD standard is an effective tool of
the Chinese appellate courts in scrutinizing trial judgments and granting RA.
Otherwise, depending on further analysis, we could infer that the BARD
standard did not add much value to the original criminal standard of proof in
China (RS).
iv.

Indicator 3: Non-prosecution rate

At the beginning of a criminal proceeding, a prosecutor must evaluate
the merits of the case and determine whether the evidence against the accused

common in China for witnesses to provide written statements at police stations or to
procurators prior to trial. . . . Chinese judges decide guilt [or not] on these written witness
statements . . . made pre-trial” as well as other documentary evidence. This tradition of
written-evidence based criminal trials makes it possible for the Chinese appellate court to
review the facts. See Wang & Caruso, supra note 204, at 52 (describing the role of witness
testimony in Chinese criminal trials); see also An Ping, (安平), Nie Shubin Zaishen Gaipan
Wuzui An (聂树斌再审改判无罪案) [Nie Shubin found not guilty at the last appellate
proceeding], Renmin Fayuan Bao (人民法院报), [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY], (Sept. 12,
2019), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2019/09/id/4473539.shtml.
222 See, e.g., An Ping, supra note 221 (stating that after a retrial “[t]he verdict of the
original trial was revoked and [the defendant] was acquitted.”).
223 Id.
224 See supra Part V(C)(ii).
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is sufficient to warrant a meaningful trial.225 The mere fact that the judge will
explicitly impose the BARD standard presumably has a shadow-effect in
deterring prosecution of any case that the prosecutor thinks cannot meet the
standard of proof. Admittedly, many other factors (e.g., political
considerations)226 contribute to the non-prosecution rate, and no data can
show the reasons behind each such decision. However, ceteris paribus, our
fourth hypothesis is that an effective BARD standard will contribute to an
increase of the non-prosecution rate post-2013 in China. To test this
hypothesis, we observed changes in the nationwide non-prosecution rate as
published by the Annual Working Reports of the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate between 2007 and 2018,227 checking whether a statistically
significant change marks the number of non-prosecution cases after 2013. As
with Indicator 1,228 we also performed a regression analysis to observe
whether the BARD standard contributes to these changes in a statistically
significant way.

225

Hannah Meinke, Prosecution vs. Defense: A Discovery of the Differences, RASMUSSEN
UNIV. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.rasmussen.edu/degrees/justicestudies/blog/prosecution-vs-defense (stating that after someone is arrested, a prosecutor
must “consider the burden of proof and their ability to successfully prosecute a case. . . .
A prosecutor must have sufficient evidence to meet the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt used in criminal cases.”).
226 See e.g., Matthew Boyle, Grassley: Politics in US attorney’s decision not to prosecute
Holder?, YAHOO NEWS (June 29, 2012), https://news.yahoo.com/news/grassley-politicsus-attorney-decision-not-prosecute-holder-210409449.html; Josh Gerstein, Judge orders
release of DOJ memo justifying not prosecuting Trump, POLITICO (May 4, 2021),
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/04/trump-obstruction-justice-doj-485360.
227 The Annual Working Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, supra note 203.
228 See supra Part V(C)(i).
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D. Analysis: Application and implications of the Chinese judicial data
i.

Reflection on Indicator 1: Impact of the reasonable doubt
standard on acquittal rate

In Figure 4, we can observe the total number of acquittals as a
percentage of all criminal cases terminated in China from 2007 through 2018.
The annual acquittal rate diminished drastically over the period from 2007
through 2012, rebounded at a less drastic rate during the period from 2013
through 2017, and decreased again in 2018.

Acquittal Rate (‱) in China (2007-2018)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4

2
0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Figure 4
The trends in the acquittal rate in China in the post-2013 period send mixed
signals. On the one hand, the upward trend we observed between 2013 and
2017 affirms our hypothesis that the BARD standard, if effective, will
safeguard those cases where evidence is too weak to survive the BARD
standard. The overall acquittal rate in Chinese criminal cases should increase
after 2013, as compared to the immediately preceding period, which is exactly
what happened. On the other hand, the acquittal rate suffered a sharp drop in
2018, not only neutralizing the cumulative gains from 2013–17 but also
reaching a new low for the acquittal rate across the entire period of
observation. Such a sudden reversal indicates either that the implementation
of the BARD standard is ineffective or that it alone cannot explain changes in
China’s annual acquittal rate after 2013.
In order to test whether the BARD standard affected the observed
trend in the acquittal rate in the post-2013 period, we designed a treatment
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effect regression model, an analytic tool used in the field of econometrics.229
Specifically, such a model allows us to examine whether the acquittal rate
post-2013 is statistically different from that of the pre-2013 period.230 If the
answer is yes, we may draw a preliminary conclusion that BARD may have
had some effect in stabilizing a downward trend in the acquittal rate in China
since the early 2000s (i.e., the introduction of BARD helped rebound the
acquittal rate). A simple treatment effect model is shown in Equation (i):
𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼2013 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝜖;
In Equation (i), 𝛽0 represents the average acquittal rate, and D is the dummy
indicator231 for the treatment study, i.e., D is a binary variable, with its value
equal to 1 for the period after the promulgation of the BARD standard (2013–
18), and its value equal to 0 for the period prior to the promulgation of the
BARD standard (2007–12).232 Furthermore, 𝛼2013 represents the treatment
effect brought by the BARD standard. As an illustration, if 𝛼2013 equals 0,
then the model would suggest that the acquittal rate for 2007–12 would be
similar to that of 2013–18. On the other hand, if 𝛼2013 is negative, then for
the years after 2013, we would expect an acquittal rate lower than it would
otherwise be for years prior to 2013. Conversely, a positive 𝛼2013 would
suggest that the average post-2013 acquittal rate should be higher than it
As used in econometrics, the term “treatment effect” refers to the causal effect of a
binary variable on an outcome variable of interest, in this case, the Indicators. Treatment
effects are often estimated using social experiments, regression models, matching
estimators, and instrumental variables. See Joshua D. Angrist, Treatment Effects, MIT
ECONOMICS, http://economics.mit.edu/files/32 (last visited Oct. 4, 2021) (explaining the
core principles of treatment effects); FUMIO HAYASHI, ECONOMETRICS 327–45 (2000)
(showing a detailed discussion of fixed effect treatment models).
230 Following standard practice in hypothesis testing, we will conclude that the two
numbers are statistically different if we find the difference between the group means is
statistically different from zero (with a pre-specified confidence interval) and thus reject
the null hypothesis (H0) (the two groups are the same) and support the alternative
hypothesis (HA) (the two groups are different). Also, note that if two numbers are not
statistically different, it would not necessarily mean that they are the same.
231 The “Dummy” indicator denotes the treatment effect we assigned to BARD. Intuitively
speaking, it notes the period where China’s criminal justice system has adopted the BARD
standard. Thus, the value of the dummy indicator would be 0 for years prior to 2013
because there had been no BARD.
232 If we have access to case specific data points, we may utilize alternative generalized
linear regression models that may shed light as to how the BARD standard would affect
the propensity of an outcome variable, such as logistic and probit regressions. However,
for simplicity and because the outcome variables we study in this article are continuous
(either as a percentage based on linear transformations of an aggregate number or as a nonbinary percentage change), we rely on the multiple linear regression models assuming that
all assumptions of ordinary least squares have been satisfied.
229
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would otherwise be for the period prior to 2013. Given that the average
acquittal rate for the first six years is close to 11‱, and the average for the
second six years is only 7.5‱, it would be no surprise for the data to confirm
the seemingly obvious speculation that the treatment effect of BARD, 𝛼2013 ,
may be negative.
However, the more important question here is how the BARD
standard has disturbed the overall trend in the acquittal rate. A variant of the
simple treatment effect model can be seen in Equation (ii):
Δ𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛼2013 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝜖;
In Equation (ii), the dependent variable (our target variable) is now
the change in the annual acquittal rate. The equation allows us to see whether
the BARD standard affects the rate of change of the acquittal rate. As an
illustration, if 𝛼2013 equals 0, then the model would suggest that the overall
trend of change for 2007–12 would be similar to that of 2013–18. On the other
hand, if 𝛼2013 is negative, then for years after 2013, we would expect the
acquittal rate to decrease even more than it did in the years prior to 2013. On
the other hand, a positive 𝛼2013 would suggest that changes in the acquittal
rate after 2013 are less volatile (i.e., more stable) than those prior to 2013.
Table 1. Regression Results
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
Degree of Freedom
Regression
Residual
Total
Coefficients
Intercept
P-Value
𝛼2013
P-Value

Equation (i)
0.557
0.310
0.241
2.641
12

Equation (ii)
0.417
0.174
0.091
0.211
12

1
10
11

1
10
11

10.833*
0.000
-3.233
0.060

-0.215*
0.032
0.177
0.177
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* Denotes a result that is statistically significant on a 5% significance
level.233
Table 1 exhibits the regression results for Equations (i) and (ii). Consistent
with our observations of the overall data, we find a negative, statistically
significant treatment effect for Equation (i), which suggests that the acquittal
rates are statistically different across the treatment period (2013–18) and the
control period (2007–12). However, as we progress to Equation (ii), we do
not observe any statistically significant treatment effect brought by the BARD
standard. In other words, we found no strong evidence through the above
treatment effect regression analysis that the introduction of the BARD
standard affected the overall trend, or rate of change, of the acquittal rate in
China.
To further scrutinize these findings, we examined how the change in
acquittal rate evolved across the two periods by considering more variables
that may contribute to the overall changes in China’s judicial system. As
shown in Table 2, we introduced two quantifiable variables to our regression
analysis: the percentage change in the Chinese GDP growth rate, and the
percentage change in the overall crime rate in China. The Chinese GDP was
introduced because almost all of the development we have witnessed in China
has been more or less driven by its GDP growth.234 For the latter, we sense
that the overall crime rate has a complicated relationship with the acquittal
rate. In essence, we ran three sets of “difference-in-difference” regressions,
each as shown in Equation (iii):
Δ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋 + 𝛼2013 ∗ 𝐷 + 𝜖
In Equation (iii), X represents the variable that we used in the
regression analysis (change in GDP, change in crime rate, and a combination
of the two), and 𝛼2013 represents the treatment effect variable that may affect
the overall independent variable, Δ 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒, after 2013, possibly due
to the promulgation of the BARD standard. D is a binary variable that equals
to 1 for 2013 and subsequent years but equals to 0 for years earlier than 2013.
𝛽0 represents the average, and 𝜖 represents the universe of unobservable.

233 As an illustration of

hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis (H0) here involves a variable
of zero, and the alternative hypothesis (HA) involves a variable that is not zero. On a
significance level of 5%, the most popular choice in the field of econometrics, we are
willing to mistakenly reject a true null hypothesis (H0) 5% of the time. See JEFFREY
WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 124 (2013).
234 See generally Xiaodong Zhu, Understanding China's Growth: Past, Present, and
Future, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2012) (providing a comprehensive review of China’s
unprecedented economic transformation since 1978).
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Table 2. Percentage Change in Acquittal Rates in China
Year

Acquittal
Rate (‱)

Δ Acquittal
Rate (%)

Δ in GDP
(%)235

Δ Overall
Crime Rate
(%)236

2007

15

-27%

11%

11%

2008

14

-7%

-47%

10%

2009

12

-17%

-3%

9%

2010

10

-20%

12%

0%

2011

8

-25%

-11%

8%

2012

6

-33%

-22%

14%

2013

7.1

15%

-1%

13%

2014

6.6

-8%

-6%

16%

2015

8.4

21%

-6%

0%

2016

8.8

5%

-3%

5%

2017

9

2%

0%

0%

2018

5.7

-58%

-3%

0%

Three sets of regression tests were undertaken: (1) the change in
acquittal rate on the BARD treatment effect variable and change in crime rate;
(2) the change in acquittal rate on the BARD treatment effect variable and the
change in annual GPD growth rate; and (3) the change in acquittal rate on the
treatment effect variable, the overall change in crime rate, and the change in
annual GDP growth rate. Regression results, as summarized in Table 3, reveal
that the treatment effect of the BARD standard is not statistically significant
235

See The World Bank National Accounts Data: GDP Growth (Annual %)—China (20002018),
THE
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2018&locations=CN
&start=2000 (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
236
See China Crime Rate & Statistics 1995-2020, MACROTRENDS,
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CHN/china/crime-rate-statistics
(last
visited
October 4, 2021).
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to the change in the overall acquittal rate. Thus, we cannot negate the null
hypothesis (H0) that implementation of the BARD standard is not statistically
significant to changes in the annual acquittal rate in China.

Table 3. Regression Analysis
Regression
Statistics

Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Multiple R

0.495

0.496

0.509

R Square
Adjusted R
Square
Standard Error

0.245

0.246

0.259

0.094

0.095

0.012

0.212

0.211

0.221

Observations

13

13

13

Degree of
Freedom
Regression

2

2

3

Residual

10

10

9

Total

12

12

12

-0.284

-0.255

-0.284

0.027

0.013

0.035

0.210

0.209

0.214

0.108

0.109

0.120

Coefficients
Intercept
P-value
2013
P-value
Crime Rate
P-value
GPD
P-value

0.632

0.453

0.548

0.701
-0.251

-0.185

0.539

0.687

Thus, to conclude this part of analysis, we did not observe any
statistically significant impact of the BARD standard’s implementation on the
annual acquittal rate in China.
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Reflection on Indicator 2.1: Impact of the reasonable doubt
standard on criminal cases of reversal and remand

As discussed above, for the purposes of this study, we used CJO to
research and collect data on Chinese appellate court decisions to reverse and
remand trial judgments of criminal cases between 2007 and 2018.237 We
focused on the reversal and remand (RR) cases attributed to a failure of
satisfying standard of proof (SoP) in criminal proceedings generally, and a
failure of the BARD standard more specifically, as shown in Table 4.
CJO maintains a consistent case reporting of more than 50 percent of
all criminal cases that have been terminated in China since 2014. However,
CJO unfortunately contains only 5 percent of all criminal cases that terminated
in China between 2007 and 2013, and less than 17 percent of criminal cases
reported for the year 2013.238 Due to such a significant absence of data
reporting before 2013, we cannot compare an absolute number of items in
Table 4 in the pre-2013 period with corresponding numbers in the post-2013
period. Nonetheless, we can compare and analyze the percentage changes in
rates of the items before and after 2013, assuming cases of any given year
reported by CJO were randomly selected. Also, because CJO’s data reporting
since 2014 is more comprehensive, a comparison of both the absolute
numbers and their rates of change for any items between 2014 and 2018 (and
analysis of data reported in the post-2013 period generally) makes empirical
sense. With the admission that the collected data for the year of 2013 and
before are incomplete,239 our analysis may nevertheless provide a baseline
estimation of how the standard of proof, in general, and the reasonable doubt
standard, in particular, have been used as a pragmatic tool by Chinese criminal
appellate courts in granting reversals and remand.

237

See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE, supra note 200.
was launched by the Supreme People’s Court of China on July 1, 2013
and has been accessible to the public since then. See Judicial Transparency of Chinese
Courts, supra note 200, art. 3. As of November 18, 2020, our data-collection cutoff date,
CJO reported judgments of 180,128 Chinese criminal cases terminated in 2013, out of a
total number of 1,059,752 criminal cases terminated that same year in China. Nonetheless,
from the perspective of macro-statistics, even a randomly selected 1 percent of specimens
out of a pool with seven-figure numbers would be considered significant in analyzing
features of the whole pool.
239 We also noticed that CJO is continuously improving its data reporting of any given year
since 1996. The cutoff date of data collection in CJO for our study was November 18, 2020.
Therefore, our article does not reflect data updates that followed this date.
238 The CJO website
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Table 4. Reversal and Remand (Criminal Cases) in China
(based on data reported through CJO)240

Ye
ar

200
7
200
8
200
9
201
0
201
1
201
2
201
3
201
4
201
5
201
6
201
7
201
8

All
Crimin
al
Judgme
nts
reporte
d

Rever
sal
and
Rema
nd

SoP
Related
(general
ly)

SoP
Related
(general
ly) as
Percent
age

RS
Relat
ed

RS
Related
as
Percent
age

BAR
D
Relat
ed

BARD
Related
as
Percent
age

2628

1

0

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

5023

3

0

0

0

0

N/A

N/A

4999

57

4

7.02%

4

7.02%

N/A

N/A

14880

54

4

7.41%

4

7.41%

N/A

N/A

30677

82

15

18.29%

15

18.29%

N/A

N/A

80201

317

110

34.70%

110

34.70%

N/A

N/A

239718

573

140

24.43%

136

23.73%

4

0.70%

3889

769

19.77%

721

18.54%

38

0.98%

5446

1078

19.79%

1001

18.38%

71

1.30%

9405

1896

20.16%

1785

18.98%

98

1.04%

10752

2335

21.72%

2138

19.88%

161

1.50%

11422

2829

24.77%

2586

22.64%

200

1.75%

125147
7
140681
8
162439
6
150475
8
154726
8

In Table 4, we can see that the percentage of RR cases attributed to a
failed SoP has trended upward since 2013, as compared to the pre-2013
period, a sign that the BARD standard has been an effective tool of Chinese
appellate courts to scrutinize criminal trial judgments and grant reversal and

240

CJO is updating its database constantly. The cutoff time of our data collection is
November 18, 2020. All “Percentage” rates are calculated by designated data divided by
the total number of RR cases of the same year.
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remand.241 Additional evidence of an effective BARD is that the annual
number of RR cases attributed to the BARD standard increased significantly
after 2013.
However, our optimism on BARD takes a hit when our attention
shifts to the number and percentage of RR cases attributed to a failure of the
traditional Chinese standard of proof in criminal cases, “reliable and sufficient
evidence” (证据确实充分标准) (RS). To our surprise, the statistics clearly
show that RS had a dominant role in RR cases attributed to a failure of the
SoP throughout the period of observation in China, regardless of whether the
BARD standard had been implemented at the time. Also, to our surprise, a
closer look at the post-2013 period shows that the frequency of RS being used
by the Chinese appellate courts in granting reversal and remand in that period
increased drastically, with a margin much larger than the increase in usage of
BARD during the same period. Even though both the number and rate of
BARD-related RR cases steadily increased after 2013, both its numbers and
its percentages over the years are consistently smaller than those for RSrelated cases. All these facts in turn indicate that the role of BARD in criminal
RR cases in China is at best minimal.
Therefore, even though the BARD standard had a positive effect in
Chinese appellate courts on the granting of reversals and remand, its role is
minimal; even though the usage of BARD in RR cases increased steadily after
its 2013 implementation, it was overshadowed by the magnitude of growth in
usage of the traditional Chinese criminal standard of proof (RS) during this
period. This situation suggests that the BARD standard not only is far from
ready to replace the traditional Chinese criminal standard of proof but also
only plays a marginal, supporting role in judicial fact-finding of criminal cases
in China.
iii.

Reflection on Indicator 2.2: Impact of the reasonable doubt
standard on cases of reversal and direct acquittal

As discussed above, a unique practice in Chinese criminal
proceedings allows the Chinese criminal appellate court to grant reversal and
acquittal (RA) directly.242 CJO currently provides the best available data on
241

Noticeably, percentage changes between 2012 and 2013 in SoP-related RR cases are
contrary to the general trend we have described. Nonetheless, we believe that this “noise”
is probably caused by insufficient data reporting of CJO in these two years, which should
not affect our overall judgment here on the trends in the post-2013 period, as compared
with the pre-2013 period.
242 See Wang & Caruso, supra note 204 at 57–58. For both civil and criminal cases, the
Chinese appellate court can review both questions of law and questions of fact. Thus, in
practice, the parties can experience a “trial” all over again in the appellate court in China.
Thus, the appeals proceeding is called “the second instance trial” in China.
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Chinese criminal appellate court RA decisions, both those attributed to a
failure to satisfy the standard of proof in criminal proceedings generally, and
those attributed to the failure of the BARD standard more specifically (see
Table 5).

Table 5. Reversal and Acquittal (directly) in China
(based on data reported in CJO)243

Ye
ar

All
Crimin
al
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d
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(direct
ly)

SoP
Related
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ly)

SoP
Related
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Related
as
Percent
age

20
07

2628

0

0

N/A

0

20
08

5023

0

0

N/A

20
09

4999

0

0

20
10

14880

0

20
11

30677

20
12
20
13

243

BAR
D
Relat
ed

BARD
Related
as
Percent
age

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

0

0

N/A

0

N/A

N/A

N/A

80201

5

0

0%

0

0%

N/A

N/A

239718

6

2

33.33%

1

16.67%

1

16.67%

CJO updates its database constantly. The cutoff time of our data collection was
November 18, 2020. All percentage rates are calculated by designated data divided by the
total number of RA cases of the same year.
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20
14

125147
7

68

52

76.47%

37

54.41%

12

17.65%

20
15

140681
8

84

78

92.86%

60

71.43%

10

11.90%

20
16

162439
6

132

118

89.39%

99

75.00%

11

8.33%

20
17

150475
8

181

180

99.45%

147

81.12%

26

14.36%

20
18

154726
8

183

181

98.91%

153

83.61%

24

13.11%

Throughout the period of observation of our study, RA cases
accounted for 0.01 percent or less of all criminal cases in China, a much
smaller magnitude than RR cases. As discussed in our analysis of Indicator
2.1, significant absence of data reporting of CJO before 2013 makes it
meaningless to compare absolute numbers of RA cases attributable to SoP,
RS, and BARD in the pre-2013 period with corresponding numbers in the
post-2013 period. Moreover—and unlike with Indicator 2.1—due to the fact
that the reported data of RA cases in Table 5 during the entire pre-2013 period
is proximate to zero, we also cannot compare and analyze changes in rate
(percentage) of numbers before and after 2013. However, the data reporting
after 2013 does allow us to compare and analyze the change in absolute
numbers and rate of any items in Table 5 between 2013 and 2018.
From Table 5, we can see that after the BARD standard was
implemented in Chinese criminal proceedings in 2013, both the total number
of RA cases and the number of such cases attributed to a failure of the BARD
standard steadily increased, a positive sign that BARD is an effective tool
utilized by the Chinese appellate courts to scrutinize criminal trial judgments
and grant reversal and acquittal directly. However, when our attention shifts
to the number and percentage of RA cases attributed to the failure of the
traditional Chinese standard of proof in criminal cases (RS), as compared to
RA cases attributed to SoP in general and those attributed to BARD, we have
to reevaluate our impression of the impact BARD made. As with Indicator
2.1, the RS standard appears to be more common in Chinese appellate court
decisions to grant reversal and acquittal in the post-2013 period, relegating the
BARD standard to a supporting role.
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Reflection on Indicator 3: Impact of the reasonable doubt
standard on non-prosecutions

Unfortunately, no available data can shed light on the reasons behind
individual decisions to not prosecute cases in China. We nevertheless would
expect that the implementation of the BARD standard in 2013 would
contribute to an increase in the non-prosecution rate in China due to the
assumption that procurators would likely be deterred, at least to some extent,
from pressing charges with weak evidence given that an assumed higher
standard of proof now puts a heavier burden of proof on the shoulder of the
procurator and thus a heightened scrutiny of evidence against the accused.
Table 6 reproduces data published by the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate of China in its Annual Working Report between 2007 and 2018
regarding non-prosecutions collected from all levels of the People’s
procuratorates in the country.244 At the first glance, the total number of nonprosecuted cases and the percentage of cases that the procuratorates decided
to not prosecute among all criminal cases appear to be on an upward trend in
the post-2013 period, a positive sign that the reasonable doubt standard is
effective in China.
Table 6. Non-Prosecution Rate in China
Years
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

Cases of NonProsecution
27995
29871
25576
37468
39754
N/A
67820
75487
76565
N/A
111878
136970

Non-Prosecution
Rate (%)
2.52
2.54
2.20
3.16
3.20
N/A
4.87
5.15
5.22
N/A
6.15
7.49

Change in NonProsecution (%)
N/A
0.79%
-13.39%
43.64%
1.27%
N/A
N/A
5.75%
1.36%
N/A
N/A
21.79%

However, two concerns from Table 6 must be addressed. First, the
upward trend of both number and rate of the non-prosecuted cases begins at
See The Annual Working Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, supra note
203.
244
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least as far back as 2007, the earliest year of our observation period, rather
than appearing as a new occurrence after the BARD standard was
implemented. This fact may suggest that the observed trend relates not to the
implementation of BARD but to some other factor(s) in China that we have
not yet identified. Second, if we look at percentage change in the nonprosecution cases over the years, we find that the year-to-year changes both
before and after 2013 are rather random and volatile, which again may suggest
that the BARD standard is irrelevant to such changes. In fact, we performed
another treatment effect regression to see whether the year-to-year changes in
non-prosecution rates were statistically different in the post-2013 period, and
we failed to observe statistically significant evidence that the BARD standard
contributes to the changes in non-prosecutions in China. The regression
statistics are shown in Table 7.
Table 7. Regression Results
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations
Degree of Freedom
Regression
Residual
Total
Coefficients
Intercept
Dummy

0.045
0.002
-0.198
0.203
7
df
1
5
6
0.081
0.462
0.016
0.924

Since a People’s procuratorate may decide against prosecution for a
number of inherently unobservable reasons—including political
considerations, policies, lack of evidence, and more245—we must conclude

245

See, e.g., Renmin Jiancha Yuan Dui Naxie Anjian Keyi Jueding Bu Qisu? (人民检察

院对哪些案件可以决定不起诉？) [Which cases can the People’s Procuratorate decide
not to prosecute?], Zhongguo Renda Wang (中国人大网) [NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS
NET]
(Dec.
17,
2000),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c2279/200012/dbb697b0920344709101fd6db667e03f.shtml.
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that even though the non-prosecution rate in China increased significantly
after 2013, we do not yet have strong evidence that this change had anything
to do with the implementation of the BARD standard. These findings affirm
our earlier findings for Indicators 2.1 and 2.2, that the BARD standard is not
frequently used by the Chinese courts, as well as our overall impressions from
Indicators 1, 2.1, and 2.2 that, even though the BARD standard has proven
occasionally helpful for the Chinese criminal justice system in restraining
wrongful convictions, its impact has been very limited so far and not very
effective.
E. Limitations of the Chinese case study
By observing and analyzing three Indicators (acquittal rate, reversal
rate, and non-prosecution rate) across criminal cases in China for the two sixyear periods that immediately precede and follow January 1, 2013, the
benchmark date of the BARD standard’s implementation in China,246 we were
able to conclude that the BARD standard appears to be supportive in averting
wrongful convictions in China, but that it does not have a convincing or
immediate effect on minimizing wrongful convictions therein.
Our work may be the only empirical study of this issue in existence. That
said, this case study of the BARD standard in China has certain limitations.
There are four major concerns that we would have liked to better address.
First, the empirical data we collected is not flawless. Even though we had a
great amount of data available, the problem of lack of data that has troubled
many previous researchers in conducting empirical studies on the BARD
standard also inevitably exists in our research. The period of time from which
we chose to collect data regarding the three Indicators from the Chinese
criminal justice system is between 2007 and 2018, or the six years before and
the six years after the 2012 Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law took
into effect on January 1, 2013.247 One may argue that our selection of the
twelve-year study period may be inadequate to make any genuine judgment
on the subject at issue. We agree that this is a legitimate concern, since a newly
adopted rule may take longer than six years to make an observable impact in
a nation’s criminal justice system. However, with the numerous constraints
above-mentioned, there appears to exist no other alternative period of study
in Chinese history that would be more conducive to such observation.248
Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196, art. 53.
Id.
248 As we discussed above, the twelve-year period (2007–18) is the most (if not the only)
suitable window to observe the effectiveness of BARD in Chinese criminal proceedings,
since the Criminal Procedure Law of China was amended again at the end of 2018 with
substantial changes (new variables, e.g., a whole new mechanism of plea bargaining with
246
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Second, even though we focused on the period from 2007 to 2018,
we only had comprehensive data for the years of 2014 to 2018. The collected
data of 2013 barely qualified for our analysis of Indicators 2.1 and 2.2, and
data from earlier years was even sparser. CJO, the database we used for this
research, is the only online, freely accessible judicial database to be authorized
and operated by the Supreme People’s Court of China, as well as the most
comprehensive database available to the public. Unfortunately, CJO was only
launched on July 1, 2013,249 and it has so far been slow to upload case
materials that predate its founding. Another potential issue with CJO is that
even though it is the best available judicial database in China, and has a fairly
large collection of judicial documents and other related materials, its
collection of case judgments and related materials (even after 2013) is still
incomplete, representing only a portion of all cases terminated each year in
China, no matter civil or criminal.250 One indication of this issue is the way
that the CJO database is updated constantly, with new case materials for
multiple years being uploaded into the system and made available to the public
on a daily basis.251 The problem is that we do not know what is still missing
for the case data of each year, since the CJO website includes no explanation
about the missing data or its algorithm in updating the database.252
Moreover, a prerequisite for this study is that the study’s environment
should remain ceteris paribus—other variables in the targeted criminal justice
system before and after the benchmark should remain more or less in the same
condition throughout the period of observation. As discussed above, we
assumed that our case study on China satisfies such a requirement because,
across the twelve-year period, the Criminal Procedure Law of China was only
amended once, in 2012, when the reasonable doubt standard was added into
the law.253 However, in fact, all variables of any criminal justice system,
including the one in China, are constantly changing. That is just the nature of
our world. Also, factors outside of the criminal justice system may also affect
the results of our study, making it even more complex. In this study, we
conducted regression analyses on Indicator 1 via the fixed effect treatment
model in order to take into account other major variables such as China’s GDP
and the crime rate. We also performed a reduced form regression analysis on
Indicator 3. However, in reality, our regression analyses may be too narrow
Chinese characteristics) being made to the Chinese criminal justice system. These changes
remove the necessary condition of constancy, impairing our ability to continue a study into
BARD’s impact. See Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra
note 196.
249 See Judicial Transparency of Chinese Courts, supra note 200, art. 3.
250 See CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE, supra note 200.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196, art. 53.
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in scope to distill the impact of BARD. Relatedly, even if we were able to
identify other important variables that may have affected our study, it would
likely be difficult to quantify them in such a way that would allow for a
follow-up treatment effect regression analysis.
Finally, we must reiterate that the three Indicators we designed are proxies for
changes in the number of wrongful convictions. We do not have direct data
on wrongful convictions, and the Indicators and methodology we used in this
study may be improved as data becomes more available in the future.
VI.

REFLECTION AND CONCLUSION

If our earlier historical and epistemological analyses of the BARD
standard highlight as many unresolved questions as they do answers—
pointing to the slipperiness of the BARD standard when trying to pin it down
through definition or quantification—our latter empirical analysis is no less
ambivalent. Our empirical study into the Chinese case shows that although
the 2013 implementation of the BARD standard was helpful in restraining
wrongful convictions, such an effect has been very limited. Even that limited
finding helps shed new light on the inner workings of the BARD standard, as
we will explain.
First, theoretically speaking, a comparison between Figures 1 and 2
in Part II254 shows that when the vertical SoP line moves toward the right (i.e.,
when the standard of proof in criminal cases gets higher), its effect on
suppressing wrongful convictions is stronger. Since BARD has been broadly
recognized as a high standard of proof, it is expected to function as an
effective tool in eliminating wrongful convictions. Nonetheless, when people
say that BARD is a high standard of proof, they are speaking relatively:
BARD is a higher standard of proof than, for example, the “preponderance of
evidence” and “clear and convincing standard” of civil cases. Conversely,
when it is compared with the degree of absolute certainty, BARD is clearly a
lower standard. What lurks here is the first point we would like to illustrate
with regard to the Chinese case: before the BARD standard was implemented
in China in 2013, the standard of proof in criminal cases had been “reliable
and sufficient evidence” (RS), which many Chinese judges, practitioners, and
legal scholars consider to be a very high standard as well.255 When we
compare the BARD standard to the RS standard, we find that it is hard to tell
whether one is clearly higher than the other. Furthermore, taking into account
a local context in which Chinese legal culture has previously emphasized that
254

See supra Part II(B).
See Chen Ruihua (陈瑞华), Xingshi Susong Zhong De Zhengming Biaozhun (刑事诉
讼中的证明标准) [Standard of Proof in Criminal Proceedings], 3 Suzhou Daxue Xuebao
(Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) (苏州大学学报 (哲学社会科学版)) [JOURNAL OF SOOCHOW
UNIVERSITY (PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION)] 77–78, 191 (2013).
255
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evidence presented at trial should reflect the objective truth of past events at
issue,256 we find good arguments that the RS standard in Chinese criminal
cases “feels” even higher than the BARD standard.257 If our understanding is
correct here, then the implementation of the BARD standard in China in 2013
would not have an effect of shifting the SoP line toward the right (in Figures
1 and 2)258 and thus would not have decreased wrongful convictions in China.
This leaves the question of, if the RS standard is so high, then why did Chinese
legislators adopt the BARD standard in the 2012 Amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Law?259 We believe that they did so because “reliable and
sufficient evidence” is too vague, even more so than “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” For many years, Chinese judges, lawyers, and scholars have
complained that the old standard of proof in criminal cases is more of an
aspirational motto than a workable solution.260 Some Chinese legal experts
even declared this ambiguous standard of proof to be a direct cause of the
wrongful convictions exposed in China.261 In the 2012 Amendments to the
Criminal Procedure Law, Chinese legislators were able to add the BARD
standard into the standard of proof provision, Article 53.262 The original
standard remains in the law,263 with both standards now co-existing in the
256

See generally Fan Chongyi (樊崇义), Keguan Zhenshi Guanjian—Jianlun Xingshi
Susong Zhengming Biaozhun (客观真实管见—兼论刑事诉讼证明标准) [Opinions on
Objective Truth—Also on the Standard of Proof in Criminal Proceedings], 1 Zhongguo
Faxue (中国法学) [CHINA LEGAL SCI.] 114 (2000).
257 See, e.g., Pan Zhiyong (潘志勇), Paichu Heli Huaiyi Bu Dengyu Zhengju Queshi
Chongfen (排除合理怀疑不等于证据确实充分) [Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is
Not Equal to Reliable and Sufficient Evidence], 8 Zhongguo Jiancha Guan (中国检察官)
[CHINESE PROCURATORS] 56–57 (2015).
258 See supra Part II(B).
259 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196, art. 53.
260 See generally Xu Yang (徐阳), Woguo Xingshi Susong Zhengming Biaozhun Shiyong
Guannian Zhi Sikao—Cong Zengqiang Ke Caozuo Xing Dao Zengqiang Caozuo
Guocheng De Guifan Xing (我国刑事诉讼证明标准适用观念之思考——从增强可操
作性到增强操作过程的规范性) [Thoughts on the Applicability of China’s Criminal
Standard of Proof – From Enhancing Operability to Enhancing the Standardization of
Operating Process], 2 Fashang Yanjiu (法商研究) [STUD. L. & BUS.] 64 (2017).
261 See generally Zhang Baosheng (张保生), Xingshi Cuoan Jiqi Jiucuo Zhidu De Zhengju
Fenxi(刑事错案及其纠错制度的证据分析) [Evidentiary Analysis on Wrongful
Convictions and the Correction Mechanism], 1 Zhongguo Faxue (中国法学) [CHINA
LEGAL SCI.] 90 (2013); Zhang Zongliang (张宗亮), Woguo xingshi Cuoan Yanjiu
Zongshu(我国刑事错案研究综述) [A Research Overview of Misjudged Criminal Cases
in China], 5 Shandong Jiancha Xueyuan Xuebao (山东检察学院学报) [Journal of
Shandong Police College] 20 (2013).
262 Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 196, art. 53.
263 Id.
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same provision.264 We interpret this particular legislative arrangement as a
reflection of the intent of the Chinese legislators: they wanted to use “beyond
a reasonable doubt” to explain what “reliable and sufficient evidence” actually
means. Unfortunately, as discussed in Part I of this article265 (and perhaps
unbeknown to those Chinese legislators), the reasonable doubt standard itself
does not have a clear and settled explanation at all. Thus, because the BARD
standard was simply added into the criminal procedure law without any
further explanation or guidance, fact-finders in Chinese criminal cases still
very likely get confused on what the standard of proof means and thus apply
it inconsistently.
At the end of the day, we reflect that the RS standard and the BARD
standard are effectively treated the same in practice. China’s move to the
BARD standard was a formal change only and did not alter the substance of
its criminal justice practice. The formal SoP may not matter all that much.
Whether we call it “beyond a reasonable doubt” or not, courts have some
intuitive understanding of the high standard of proof required in the criminal
context and are going to apply it accordingly. Words effectively cannot
describe the standard adequately.
Based on our multifaceted analysis of the BARD standard, we
surmise that, in the end, the reasonable doubt standard has no magic after all.
The standard only works well in preventing innocent defendants from being
wrongfully convicted when it is applied together with other “defendantfriendly” mechanisms. Over the years, criminal justice systems all over the
world have developed numerous “defendant-friendly” principles and rules to
protect innocent persons from being wrongfully convicted, including but not
limited to the presumption of innocence,266 the prosecutorial burden of
proof,267 robust evidence rules,268 the Miranda warning,269 the privilege
against self-incrimination,270 the Confrontation Clause,271 the right to

264

Id.
See supra Part I(B).
266 See Model Charge: Burden of Proof Presumption of Innocence, Reasonable Doubt,
supra note 184.
267 Id.
268 See e.g., The Exclusionary Rule as a Symbol of the Rule of Law, 67 SMU L. REV. 821,
821 (2014).
269
See Amdt. 5.3.2.2.3.2.2 Requirements of Miranda, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt5_3_2_2_3_2_2 (last visited Oct. 6,
2021).
270 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
271 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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counsel,272 and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof.273 All these
mechanisms interrelate and, by working together, grow into an enormous
safety network in common law countries for protecting innocent persons from
wrongful convictions.
Conversely, the criminal justice system of China had to rebuild itself
beginning in 1979 with the “Reform and Opening Up” policy, which came
after the ten years of the ruinous Cultural Revolution.274 Although judicial
reforms in China have made significant progress over the years, most
“defendant-friendly” mechanisms are still either missing or severely
underdeveloped in China. For example, for many years the single most
important goal of the criminal justice system in China was to combat and
crackdown on crime.275 Even nowadays, it is still debatable whether
defendants are presumed innocent or presumed guilty in criminal
procedures.276 Evidence law is still a new subject, and only a few, fragmented
evidentiary rules have been established in China.277 Neither the Miranda
warning, nor privilege against self-incrimination, nor anything like the
Confrontation Clause exists in China. The adversary system and advocacy are
still weak in Chinese criminal trials.278 And the list goes on. The adoption of
the BARD standard is definitely a positive sign, showing that China has
started to turn toward establishing a “defendant-friendly” criminal justice
system and protecting the fundamental human rights of criminal defendants.
Yet, such a singular solution in the absence of an entire supporting mechanism
seems too little to be useful. The criminal justice system nowadays in China
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See Model Charge: Burden of Proof Presumption of Innocence, Reasonable Doubt,
supra note 184.
274 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 6–7 (2002);
see generally Pitman B. Potter, Review: Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and
Selective Adaptation, 29 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 465 (2004).
275 See, e.g., Stanley Lubman, China’s Criminal Procedure Law: Good, Bad and Ugly, THE
WALL STREET JOURNAL (March 21, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-15476.
276 See, e.g., Huang Meiyan (黄梅艳), Youzui Tuiding De Sibian Zhimei (有罪推定的思
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See Jia Li & Zhuhao Wang, A Trail to Modernity: Observations on the New
Developments of China's Evidence Legislation Movement in a Global Context, 21 IND. J.
OF GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 683, 683 (2014).
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is still largely hostile to the accused.279 The BARD standard can only do so
much in such an environment, without other “defendant-friendly”
mechanisms one would find in a common law BARD ecosystem.
Finally, although we are hesitant to make this observation, there
seems to be a cultural, or local, aspect to the standard of proof in criminal
cases. What works well (and has such long precedent) in the common law
system cannot necessarily be successfully transplanted to China: elements are
lost in translation, lost to a lack of history and understanding, and lost to
cultural differences. We see this pattern at work in our empirical section in
the discussion of Indicators 2.1 and 2.2: the RS standard experienced a sudden
surge of usage in the post-2013 period after the BARD standard was
implemented, which cannot be explained except for cultural reasons. 280
Taking a step back, then, we find it understandable that people of each country
are proud of inventions made by their own countrymen, including legal terms,
and might not so easily adopt conceptualizations from other countries.
In summary, and to return to the enigmatic smile of Leonardo’s Mona
Lisa, this multifaceted engagement with the BARD standard reveals that the
more we peel away the layers of mystery that surround BARD, the more
questions and difficulties arise. Even so, we believe that this investigation—
historical, epistemological, and especially empirical—offers an important
step toward a more contextualized and rigorous understanding of the effect of
BARD on restraining wrongful convictions.
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